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LOCAL 82, FURNITURE MOVING DRIVERS V.
CROWLEY: A RESTATEMENT OF
INSTITUTIONAL POWER UNDER
TITLES I AND IV OF THE
LMRDA
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA),1 also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, is an ambiguous docu-
ment.2 The LMRDA is a product of unusual political alignments, with
Republicans advocating broad individual rights,3 Democrats favoring insti-
tutional over individual interests,' and southern lawmakers forsaking their
1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as
LMRDA or the Act and referenced by section number or title].
2. As Professor Archibald Cox notes, many sections of the LMRDA "contain calculated
ambiguities or political compromises essential to secure a majority"; therefore, the courts
should "seek out the underlying rationale without placing great emphasis upon close construc-
tion of the words." Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of
1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 852 (1960), cited with approval in Local 82, Furniture Moving
Drivers v. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. 2557, 2566 n.17 (1984). See also D. MCLAUGHLIN & A.
SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION DEMOCRACY 7 (1979) ("By design,
much of the language of Title IV is quite broad and somewhat vague."); Aaron, The Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 863 (1960) ("The
language of section 101(a), despite its specificity, is sufficiently ambiguous to create several
problems of interpretation."); Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 46 VA. L. REV. 195, 225 (1960) (noting the "somewhat awkward and confusing" lan-
guage of § 402(c)). The crucial point is not that Congress should be criticized for enacting
ambiguous legislation, but that the ambiguities should be recognized for what they are and
what they suggest about congressional intent. The presence of ambiguous language in a statute
requires the interpreter to consider additional factors, such as its legislative history and the
social problems it addresses. The interpreter's task is to determine which of several possible
referents Congress meant to signify when it used certain words. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02 (4th ed. 1973).
3. Senators Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) assailed the Demo-
cratic majority's failure to include in the Senate committee's version of the proposed legislation
a "bill of rights" for union members. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, S. REP. No. 187, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71, reprinted in I NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 466-67 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
4. Instead of a federally enforceable bill of rights for union members, the Senate commit-
tee majority, led by Senator John Kennedy (D-Mass.), advocated a voluntary code of ethics
that would reflect labor's "considerable capacity to regulate [its] own affairs." Id at 23, 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 419.
Catholic University Law Review
antipathy towards organized labor to defend unions against overregulation.5
The Act guarantees rights to union members yet seems to defer to the very
authorities whose conduct in union office had abrogated those rights.6 It
makes enforcement contingent on vague balances of interest, relying on such
concepts as "adequate," "appropriate," "fair," and "reasonable." ' 7 With lit-
tle apparent consistency, the Act creates various private, administrative,
civil, and criminal remedies.8 Even its name is ambiguous: "Labor-Manage-
5. Senator Olin Johnston (D-S.C.), voicing his opposition to federally enforceable indi-
vidual rights for union members, declared that although no one in the Senate was more anx-
ious than he "to restrain corrupt labor leaders from taking advantage of honest working
people," he would never vote for such legislation if its expansion of federal authority would
"set the stage to destroy our school systems in the South and place a direct threat against our
local and State school officials .... ." 105 CONG. REC. 6696 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT
OF 1959, at 1223 [hereinafter cited as 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
6. See, e.g., LMRDA § 101(a)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1), (2) (1982) (granting certain
rights subject to "reasonable" rules established by the union); id. §§ 101(a)(4), 402(a), 29
U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(4), 482(a) (1982) (requiring a union member to pursue or exhaust internal
remedies before suing the union or seeking relief through the Secretary of Labor); id. § 401(e),
29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1982) (granting the rights to nominate candidates and run for office subject
to "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed" by the union).
These qualifications on rights were intended to strike a balance between the individual inter-
ests of union members and the institutional interests of the union. Atleson, A Union Member's
Right of Free Speech and Assembly.- Institutional Interests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 403, 443-44 (1967). One difficulty with such flexible language, however, is that the
courts that interpret the statute may lose sight of the principal legislative concern, which was
to guarantee the rights of the member within his union, not to increase the union's power over
the members. See Summers, Pre-emption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Reme-
dies, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 119, 124 (1961). Accord Note, Union Elections under the LMRDA, 74
YALE L.J. 1281, 1285 (1965). Indeed, the Supreme Court's focus in a recent title I decision fell
on the proviso rather than the protected right. See United Steelworkers of America v. Sadlow-
ski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982), where a five-to-four majority, relying on the § 101(a)(2) proviso mak-
ing free speech restrictable by "reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member
toward the organization as an institution," declared that it was not a violation of a member's
free speech rights for the union to prohibit him as a candidate for union office from accepting
campaign contributions from nonmembers. Although the rule applied equally to all candi-
dates, it had virtually no ill effect on the incumbents but adversely affected the nonincumbents,
whose campaigns to unseat the ruling faction had prompted the adoption of the rule in the first
place. See Note, Steelworkers v. Sadlowski: Undermining Unionism through Restrictions
upon Campaign Financing and Speech, 48 ALB. L. REV. 173, 177 (1983).
7. See supra note 6. See also LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1982) (requiring
"[a]dequate safeguards to insure a fair election"); id. § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982) (enabling
aggrieved persons to bring suit for "such relief . ., as may be appropriate" for violations of tit.
I). The use of indefinite language gives the courts a major role in giving content to these
provisions. See Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE L.J. 1221, 1222
(1961).
8. Private civil remedies are available under § 102 to enforce the LMRDA bill of rights;
§ 201(c) to inspect financial records; § 401(c) to compel the distribution of campaign litera-
ture; § 501 to enforce fiduciary standards; and § 609 to remedy improper discipline. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 412, 431(c), 481(c), 501, 529 (1982). The Secretary of Labor may bring civil actions
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ment" implies a far greater burden on employers than the statute actually
imposes;9 "Reporting and Disclosure" alludes to only one of its seven ti-
tles;'° and "Landrum-Griffin" immortalizes not its most substantive contrib-
utors, but rather the compilers of the composite bill that most closely
resembled the final enactment.' 1
One of the most troublesome ambiguities for the courts has been the rela-
tionship between title I, which contains a "Bill of Rights" for union mem-
bers,' 2 and title IV, which sets forth standards for unions to follow in
conducting elections of officers. 13 Although there are differences in lan-
under § 104 to enforce the member's right to a copy of the collective bargaining agreement;
§ 210 to enforce the reporting requirements; and § 402 to enforce the election provisions. See
29 U.S.C. §§ 414, 440, 482 (1982). Under § 304, 29 U.S.C. § 464 (1982), civil action to enforce
the trusteeship provisions may be brought either by the Secretary of Labor or by any affected
member or labor organization. LMRDA § 401(h), 29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1982), concerning the
removal of officers, requires an administrative hearing. Finally, criminal sanctions are im-
posed by various provisions of tits. II, III, V, and VI. With some justification, one commenta-
tor has observed that there is no "discernible pattern of consistency" to these remedies. Smith,
supra note 2, at 197. See also Daniels, Union Elections and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 13
N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 317, 327-28 (1960) (noting "a virtual maze of concurrent, exclu-
sive, overlapping and perhaps conflicting remedies").
9. Smith, supra note 2, at 195. Except for LMRDA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 433(a) (1982),
which requires employers to file reports concerning payments to unions, union officers, and
labor relations consultants, virtually the entire burden of tits. I-IV falls on the "labor" side of
the "labor-management" forumlation.
10. See LMRDA tit. II, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1982) (Reporting by Labor Organizations,
Officers and Employees of Labor Organizations, and Employers). Other headings reveal the
full scope of the statute: tit. I, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1982) (Bill of Rights of Members of
Labor Organizations); tit. III, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1982) (Trusteeships); tit. IV, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 481-483 (1982) (Elections); tit. V, 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1982) (Safeguards for Labor Orga-
nizations); tit. VI, 29 U.S.C. §§ 521-531 (1982) (contains miscellaneous administrative and
enforcement provisions).
11. Tits. I-VI of the Landrum-Griffin bill, H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
originated in bills introduced by Sens. Kennedy and John McClellan (D-Ark.) and Rep. Carl
Elliot (D-Ala.). Cox, supra note 2, at 822-23. Attempts to popularize the more accurate
designation "Labor Reform Act" have not succeeded. See Cox, supra note 2; Summers, supra
note 6; Atleson, supra note 6, at 404.
12. LMRDA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1982), bears the heading "Bill of Rights," as distin-
guished from the similar but lengthier heading of tit. I. See supra note 10. In the context of
this Note, "bill of rights" refers only to § 101 unless otherwise specified.
13. For discussions of the election provisions and the developing case law, see Beaird,
Union Officer Election Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 51 VA. L. REV. 1306 (1965); Berchem, Labor Democracy in America: The Impact of
Titles I & IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 13 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1967); Note, The Election
Labyrinth: An Inquiry into Title IV of the LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 336 (1968); Note,
Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J. 409 (1972).
The Department of Labor's regulations interpreting tit. IV appear at 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.1-.138
(1984). The regulations are not binding on the courts, but instead "indicate the construction
of the law which will guide [the Labor-Management Services Administrator] in performing his
duties unless and until he is directed otherwise by authoritative rulings of the courts or unless
1984]
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guage, both titles protect a member's right to nominate and support candi-
dates and to vote in elections. 4 Both advance the member's right to free
speech-title I through an express grant of a substantive right,' 5 and title IV
through campaign safeguards designed to neutralize the advantages enjoyed
by incumbent officers.' 6 Additionally, both protect members from the arbi-
trary deprivation of their election rights.' 7 The titles differ, however, in the
remedies they make available to an aggrieved member. A union member
seeking relief for a violation of title I may do so through private civil action
in a federal district court after he has pursued internal union remedies.'" In
contrast, a member seeking relief for a violation of title IV must file a com-
and until he subsequently announces that a prior interpretation is incorrect." Id. § 452.1(b).
Further insight into the Department's interpretation and application of tit. IV can be gleaned
from U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMIN., UNION OFFICER
ELECTIONS AND TRUSTEESHIPS CASE DIGEST (1980 & Supp. 1 1983), which incorporates not
only court rulings, but also selected stipulated settlements, voluntary compliance determina-
tions, and complaints found to be not actionable under § 402 of the LMRDA. Finally, for a
critical appraisal of the Department's enforcement program under tit. IV, see D. MCLAUGH-
LIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, supra note 2, at ch. II.
14. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982), provides:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within
such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the
labor organization, to attend membership meetings and to participate in the delibera-
tions and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and
regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws.
LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1982), provides in part:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a rea-
sonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every mem-
ber in good standing . . . shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the
candidate or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or
improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member
thereof. . . . Each member in good standing shall be entitled to one vote.
15. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982) provides:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble
freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to
express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an elec-
tion of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting,
subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the con-
duct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the
right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsi-
bility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining
from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual
obligations.
16. See LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1982) (requiring the union to comply with
all reasonable requests for distributions of campaign literature at the candidate's expense, to
refrain from discrimination in the use of membership lists, and to provide "adequate safe-
guards" to insure a fair election). See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.67-.72 (1984).
17. See LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(5) (1982); LMRDA § 401(e), supra note
14.
18. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
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plaint with the Secretary of Labor after the member has pursued internal
union remedies. The Secretary, in turn, investigates the complaint and,
upon a finding of probable cause that a violation of title IV has occurred and
gone unremedied, files suit to overturn the election and supervise a rerun.' 9
Section 403 of the LMRDA makes the complaint to the Secretary the exclu-
sive remedy "for challenging an election already conducted,"2 0 but preserves
other remedies for violations of rights prior to the election.
The presence of two potentially conflicting remedies for violations of elec-
tion rights received little express attention from Congress in 1959 during its
deliberations on the proposed labor reform legislation.2 ' The issue inevita-
bly surfaced in the courts, however. Calhoon v. Harvey2" was the United
States Supreme Court's first decision interpreting the significant changes
brought about by the LMRDA.2 3 In Calhoon, the Court focused its atten-
tion on the allocation of institutional power between the courts and the Sec-
retary of Labor,24 holding that jurisdiction over an election-related action
under section 101(a)(1) depended solely on whether the complaint estab-
lished a violation of the rights guaranteed by that section and could not rest
"in whole or in part on allegations which in substance charge a breach of
[t]itle IV rights." 5 Instead of clarifying the ill-defined line separating title I
from title IV, however, Calhoon proved a source of confusion for the
19. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982).
20. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
21. See Local 82, Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2566-67. Commen-
tators at the time the statute was passed likewise gave little attention to the potential conflict
between the two titles. Benjamin Aaron hinted at the overlapping rights, but the conflict he
perceived was between federal and state law, not between two provisions of the LMRDA.
Aaron, supra note 2, at 864, 905. Professor Cox discussed the overlap but apparently foresaw
no problems inasmuch as "the Secretary is in charge of all proceedings to enforce the elections
requirements." Cox, supra note 2, at 834 n.52. Professor Russell Smith described tit. IV as a
"supplement" to tit. I and felt that the public remedy of tit. IV was "much more effective"
than the private remedy of tit. I; nevertheless, he did not appear to view the remedies as
conflicting. Smith, supra note 2, at 224-25. One early commentator who did perceive the
problem observed that the "solution to the conflicting maze of electoral rights enforcement
provisions of the Act would be one set of exclusive federal remedies." Daniels, supra note 8, at
330. Professor Clyde Summers appears to be alone among the early commentators in attempt-
ing to resolve the conflicting remedies rather than just criticize them. He advocated a broad
remedial interpretation of the statute, with preelection remedies available in both federal and
state court, using federal law as the substantive law in either event. Summers, supra note 6, at
137, 138 n.89. Even in the early LMRDA cases, however, he detected a "disturbing tendency"
in the federal courts to treat the post-election remedy through the Secretary of Labor as the
sole remedy for enforcing election rights. Summers, supra note 7, at 1257 n.200.
22. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
23. Id. at 141 (Stewart, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 135.
25. Id. at 138.
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courts. 26 In an effort to resolve nearly twenty years of judicial uncertainty,
the Court reviewed Local 82, Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley.27
The plaintiff union members in Crowley alleged that the union violated
their rights under sections 101(a)(1) and (2) of the LMRDA when a union
officer (who was also a candidate in the forthcoming election of officers)
barred some of the plaintiffs from a nominations meeting and refused to list
one of them on the ballot as a candidate for the office for which the members
had nominated him.2" The district court asserted jurisdiction and issued a
temporary restraining order to halt the mail-ballot election already in pro-
gress. By then, some voters had already returned marked ballots to the
union office. 29 A preliminary injunction followed, voiding the election and
ordering a new nominations meeting and election under the supervision of
an outside balloting agency.30 In a divided decision, the court of appeals
affirmed, despite the intervention of the Secretary of Labor, who argued that
the district court lacked jurisdiction under title I to enjoin the tally and or-
der the new nominations and election. 3 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the relief awarded by the district court was not "appropriate" within
the meaning of section 102 of the LMRDA because section 403 makes a suit
by the Secretary of Labor the exclusive remedy in these circumstances.32 As
in Calhoon, the Court's principal concern in Crowley lay with the Act's
scheme of apportioning enforcement power between the courts and the Sec-
retary of Labor. However, whereas the Calhoon Court had discussed the
allocation of power in terms of the right being asserted by the plaintiff, the
26. The major difficulty for the courts appears to have been a failure to appreciate the
import of the Calhoon decision's first sentence, which stated that the Court's immediate pur-
pose was to resolve questions of institutional power, not to describe the breadth of the ights
Congress had bestowed. Id. at 135. See, e.g., Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 903-04 (2d
Cir. 1973), discussed infra text accompanying notes 171-91; Kupau v. Yamamoto, 622 F.2d
449, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1980), discussed infra text accompanying notes 192-219; Schonfeld v.
Raftery, 359 F. Supp. 380, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[T]he Kuchel amendment [adding the bill of
rights to the LMRDA legislation] has been gutted, insofar as its plain meaning permits imme-
diate recourse to a federal court under [t]itle I to sustain a 'one man, one vote claim.' This
began with Calhoon v. Harvey . . . ").
27. See 104 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 & n.10 (1984).
28. Id. at 2560-61. If a complaint had been properly filed with the Secretary of Labor
under § 402 of the Act, such allegations could have been sufficient to trigger a suit by the
Secretary to overturn the election. Id. at 2571-72 n.23. Cf Marshall v. Laborers, Local 29,
106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2339 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (irregularities at nominations meeting were basis
for overturning election).
29. See 104 S. Ct. at 2561.
30. The terms of the injunction, which included detailed nominating procedures, voter
and candidate eligibility requirements, and balloting procedures, are set forth in a note at 521
F. Supp. 614, 636-37 (D. Mass. 1981).
31. 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982).
32. 104 S. Ct. at 2557, 2560, 2565-66.
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Crowley Court discussed it in terms of the remedy being sought. The Court
held that if the remedy consisted of invalidating an election and conducting
a rerun, the aggrieved member must utilize the procedure set forth in title
IV.33 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens found that relief should be
made available to the plaintiffs under title I" because the plaintiffs had es-
tablished violations of that title.
This Note will argue that the Crowley decision, although susceptible to the
criticism that it diminished members' rights by making them no broader
than the remedies available, is a logical extension of the judicial values enun-
ciated in Calhoon. The Note will demonstrate that Crowley complements
Calhoon's analysis of title I rights by analyzing title I remedies in accordance
with the earlier decision's separation of titles I and IV along the lines of
institutional enforcement powers. Drawing on the legislative history, schol-
arly commentary, and case law, the Note will suggest that the remedial
scheme of titles I and IV parallels the Act's underlying political ambiguities
yet also reflects a legislative consensus to provide for the accurate resolution
of internal union disputes by the government entity possessing the appropri-
ate expertise.
Part I of the Note will focus on the language and legislative history of the
enforcement provisions. It will suggest that Congress, although aware of the
overlap of remedies, chose not to resolve the ambiguities, thus achieving
political compromise at the expense of legal clarity. Part II will discuss
Calhoon as the vehicle for the Supreme Court's first interpretation of the
LMRDA. This section will conclude that although the Court's holding is a
narrow one, the decision is of further significance because of the scheme of
values implied by its allocation of enforcement power under the Act. Part
III will survey the ensuing confusion among the lower courts over legislative
policy and the applicability of title I in the context of an election of union
officers. Part IV will demonstrate that the Court in Crowley reiterated the
Calhoon principle that jurisdiction depends upon the appropriateness of the
forum, not upon the urgency of the plaintiff's need for relief. Finally, the
Note will conclude that although the jurisdictional question will remain am-
biguous if the plaintiff seeks a less drastic remedy than a court order voiding
and supervising a new election, Calhoon and Crowley together articulate the
values to be considered in determining whether title IV preempts title I
jurisdiction.
33. Id. at 2571.
34. Id. at 2572-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1984]
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I. THE LMRDA AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE ELUSIVE
INTENT OF CONGRESS
A. The Language of the LMRDA
The language of the LMRDA reveals but does not resolve the overlap of
rights and remedies between titles I and IV. Title I, which grants its protec-
tions as a "Bill of Rights," 35 contains certain provisions expressly related to
union elections. Members are given "equal rights and privileges" to nomi-
nate candidates and vote in elections, subject to reasonable rules in the
union's constitution and bylaws.36 They are also given equal rights to attend
meetings and participate in deliberations on union business,37 with a specific
right to express views upon candidates in an election of union officers, sub-
ject to reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings and to the
member's responsibility "toward the organization as an institution."38
Other title I rights, although not expressly connected with elections, nev-
ertheless can affect a member's ability to participate in the union's electoral
35. It does so emphatically, with this phrase appearing twice. See supra note 12. The
significance of the allusion to the federal Constitution is uncertain. Some commentators argue
that given the analogy to the Constitution, the courts have been overly broad in interpreting
the LMRDA bill of rights. See, e.g., Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin
Act, 25 ALA. L. REV. 577 (1973). The authors argue that the Second Circuit's decision in
Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963), is unduly
permissive in interpreting § 101(a)(2) to prohibit a union from disciplining members for their
criticisms of union officials, even when the criticisms may have been libelous. According to the
authors, the LMRDA's free speech provisions should be interpreted no more permissibly than
the Constitution's free speech provisions were in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), which supported only a qualified privilege of free speech. Beaird & Player, supra at
589-93. Other commentators attribute the greater breadth of the LMRDA directly to Con-
gress. See Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEO. L.J. 226, 230-32 (1959)
(arguing that the statute's language is more rigid and absolute than the Constitution's and is
therefore all the more intrusive into internal union activities). The Supreme Court has recently
shown a preference for a restricted reading of the LMRDA's free speech provision. See United
Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111, reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982) (scope of
§ 101(a)(2) not identical to scope of first amendment; union rules limiting members' free
speech need only be reasonable and need not pass stringent tests applied in first amendment
cases).
36. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), supra note 14.
37. Id.
38. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), supra note 15. The proviso of § 101(a)(2) necessitates a balanc-
ing of individual and institutional interests, but it is not clear from the language of the proviso
what balance the courts should strike. Almost any union discipline could be rationalized on
grounds of the member's responsibility to the union, but the structure of tit. I and its similari-
ties to the Constitution's Bill of Rights suggest a strong statutory interest favoring the individ-
ual member. Atleson, supra note 6, at 443-44. Some courts have struck a balance extremely
favorable to the member. See, e.g., Salzhandler, 316 F.2d at 445. For a thorough discussion of
the inclination of the courts to give Salzhandler broad application, see Beaird & Player, supra
note 35, at 588-606.
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process. An obvious example is the freedom of speech and assembly guaran-
teed in section 101(a)(2), which directly affects both a candidate's ability to
campaign for office and his supporters' ability to advance his candidacy.39
Less apparent, but no less important in relation to elections, are the statu-
tory safeguards against improper disciplinary action." Union constitutions
usually make the exercise of nominating, voting, and candidacy rights con-
tingent upon a member's good standing, and often upon continuous good
standing for a specified length of time.4' Disciplinary actions may have the
effect of suspending or interrupting good standing, with a consequent loss of
the member's election rights. Even if the substantive right itself is not ex-
pressly guaranteed by title I,42 the loss of the right can be brought within the
reach of title I through the unlawful basis for the discipline43 or the proce-
dural inadequacies affecting it. Procedural inadequacies include failure to
serve the member with written specific charges, to give the member reason-
able time to prepare a defense, or to afford the member a full and fair hear-
ing, as required by section 101(a)(5). 4
The remedies created or preserved by title I implement section 101's posi-
39. See, e.g., Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 102, discussed supra notes 6 and 35; Rollison v. Hotel
Employees, Local 879, 677 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1982) (union violated officer's free speech rights
under the LMRDA when it fined her, barred her from meetings, and barred her from holding
office for one year for allegedly using foul language towards officers and accusing union staff of
improper actions).
40. LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(5) (1982), provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or other-
wise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer
thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B)
given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; and (C) afforded a full and fair
hearing.
41. See, e.g., INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS, CONSTITUTION art. II, § 4(a)(l) (1981) (requiring 24 months continuous good
standing to be eligible for candidacy); UNITED ASS'N OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF
THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING INDUSTRY, CONSTITUTION § 124 (1982) (requiring three
years good standing for candidate eligibility); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.37, 452.86, 452.88
(1984).
42. One such right is the right to be a candidate, which is conferred by LMRDA § 401(e),
29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1982).
43. Under § 101(a)(l) and (2), restrictions on membership rights must be "reasonable."
The loss of rights as a result of an unlawful (and hence unreasonable) rule would therefore
violate title I.
44. See Hiura v. Electrical Workers, Local 1186, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2684 (D. Hawaii
1981) (procedural claim under LMRDA § 101(a)(5) maintainable even though substantive ba-
sis for discipline fell outside LMRDA). If improper disciplinary action leads to the depriva-
tion of a member's election rights, the Secretary of Labor may consider the member to be in
"good standing, entitled to all the rights guaranteed" by tit. IV. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.50
(1984). See also Donovan v. Carpenters, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2367 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
(§ 401(e) violated where union disqualified candidate on basis of disciplinary charges that were
still pending at time of disqualification).
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tive grant and protection of a member's rights. The remedial provision is
broadly worded to reach "any person" and "any violation" and to afford
"such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate."4 5 Section 102 is
limited somewhat by section 101(a)(4), which prohibits the union from limit-
ing the member's right to sue but also provides that "any such member may
be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a
four-month lapse of time)" within the union before seeking outside relief.46
However, the proviso, merely postpones and does not preempt the availabil-
ity of the federal remedy.4 7 The scope of relief is extended further by section
103, which insures that the rights and remedies granted by title I are not
interpreted to preempt those available under federal or state law or under
the union's constitution and bylaws. 4' The aggregate effect of title I is thus
to provide a statutory basis for protecting individual interests that are
threatened by assertions of institutional power over which the member-
particularly a member aligned with a political minority within the union-
has little, if any, control.
Title IV reformulates certain title I rights, but without any consistent pat-
tern. In some instances, title IV merely gives the title I right a particularized
meaning within the context of an election of officers. For example, title I's
45. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982). The Supreme Court later noted that the
"appropriate relief' standard reflected Congress' intent to give the courts wide latitude in tai-
loring the remedy to the necessities of the case. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973). But § 102
can also be interpreted to mean "only such relief as may be appropriate." The Crowley Court
utlized this type of limiting interpretation. See Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2571. For an extended
discussion of § 102 in light of Hall and Crowley, see Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d 637, 648-52
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
46. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1982).
47. Initially, there was considerable uncertainty as to how to interpret the proviso, which
seemed to alter the longstanding ability of the union to discipline a member for seeking outside
relief before exhausting his internal remedies. According to Professor Cox, the statute failed to
distinguish between two "radically different" kinds of limitations upon a member's right to
sue-first, union-imposed limitations that made the member subject to expulsion if he brought
suit without exhausting internal remedies; and second, rules of judicial administration under
which a court would not hear a member's suit against the union unless he had exhausted
internal remedies. Cox argues that only the first of these should be affected by § 101(a)(4).
Cox, supra note 2, at 839-41. See also Berchem, supra note 13, at 17-26 (lengthy discussion of
the questions raised by the proviso). The issue was subsequently decided, contrary to the Cox
position, in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426
(1968), where the Court affirmed that it is the judiciary, and not the union, that has the discre-
tion to require or waive the exhaustion of internal remedies. Despite this holding, unions
continue to attempt to discipline members for failing to exhaust internal remedies. See, e.g.,
Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 628 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981)
(§ 101(a)(4) violated when union assessed member for all litigation costs and expenses after
member unsuccessfully sued union without exhausting internal remedies as required by union
constitution).
48. LMRDA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1982).
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principle of equal rights and privileges finds expression in title IV's provi-
sions pertaining to the use of membership lists for campaigning,4 9 the distri-
bution of campaign literature,5" the mailing of election notices to all
members,51 and the uniform application of candidate eligibility standards.52
In other instances, title IV appears to strengthen title I. Whereas section
101(a)(1) has been construed to guarantee only nondiscrimination and not
the underlying substantive right to vote,53 title IV plainly grants the "right
to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates" of the mem-
ber's choice. 54 The right to be a candidate, which is not stated in title I, is
granted expressly in title IV.55 In still other instances, title IV recasts title I
rights as institutional obligations. With respect to the right to nominate can-
didates, for example, title IV requires of the union that "a reasonable oppor-
tunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates."56 The lack of a
consistent pattern to the changes in the wording of the rights defies any at-
tempt to attach significance in terms of the broadening or narrowing of the
statutory protections. Both section 101 and section 401 seem to protect indi-
vidual members against abuses by their unions. The remedies available to
49. LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1982).
50. Id.
51. Under LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1982), the union must mail an election
notice to each member at his last known home address not less than 15 days prior to the
election. The Secretary of Labor interprets "member" broadly to include all members, not just
those who are eligible to vote. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.99 (1984).
52. LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1982), provides in part, "every member in good
standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to section 504 and to
reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed)" (emphasis added).
53. The Court so held in Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 139. But see Berchem, supra note 13, at 10
("to adopt an interpretation of this section which does not provide for effective equality in
voting, . . .and which authorized pro forma observation of those rights which are granted, is
singularly objectionable"). Calhoon could create a "pre-election void" in which there are no
substantive rights under tit. I and no jurisdiction for the Secretary under tit. IV. Id. at 56.
54. LMRDA § 401(e), supra note 14. Indeed, § 401(e) arguably grants an absolute right
to vote through its requirement that "[e]ach member in good standing shall be entitled to one
vote." See Cox, supra note 2, at 833-34, 843-44. However, the Secretary of Labor interprets
§ 401(e) in conjunction with § 101(a)(l) to allow the union to qualify the right to vote by
"reasonable rules and regulations in its constitution and bylaws." 29 C.F.R. § 452.85 (1984).
One odd result of the Secretary's interpretation is that a union may apparently postpone the
right to vote until completion of a bona fide apprenticeship program, 29 C.F.R. § 452.89
(1984), even though some such programs last up to four years. See, e.g., UNITED BROTHER-
HOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, CONSTITUTION § 43 (1979). The result is
anomalous. The right to run for office, as to which a more stringent restriction would logically
be justifiable, can be subject to no more than a two-year membership requirement before the
Secretary will deem the restriction unreasonable. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.37(a) (1984). Yet the
more fundamental right-the right to vote-can be postponed for twice as long with impunity.
55. See supra note 52.
56. See supra note 14.
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enforce the rights, however, provide a clearer illustration of the difference
between title I and title IV.
The remedy created in title IV requires that a member seeking relief for
the violation of any provision of section 401 must first exhaust the remedies
available to him under the union's constitution and bylaws for three months,
or pursue them for three months without obtaining a final decision.57 The
member then has one month within which to file a complaint with the Secre-
tary of Labor. Upon receiving a timely complaint, the Secretary must con-
duct an investigation. If the Secretary has probable cause to believe a
violation has occurred and has gone unremedied, he must file suit within
sixty days seeking an order to invalidate the defective election and conduct a
rerun under his supervision.58 The court must issue such an order if it finds
that the violation "may have affected the outcome" of the election.59 Under
section 403, existing rights and remedies to enforce a union's constitution
and bylaws "with respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof' are pre-
served, and the remedy through the Secretary of Labor is made the exclusive
remedy "for challenging an election already conducted."'  The statute pro-
vides, however, no further definition of "challenging an election" or "already
conducted," thus leaving uncertain the extent of preemption effected by the
exclusivity provision of section 403.61
57. LMRDA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1982). The challenged election is presumed
valid during the pendency of an appeal, unless the union's constitution provides otherwise. See
29 C.F.R. § 452.136 (1984). The § 402 remedy has proven controversial. See, e.g., Aaron,
supra note 2, at 905 (describing it as "cumbersome"); Smith, supra note 2, at 225 (labeling it as
"awkward and confusing"); Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L.
REV. 273, 294 (1962) (viewed "of limited value"). But see S. Rep. No. 187, supra note 3, at
21, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 417 (termed "an effective and expeditious
remedy").
58. LMRDA § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1982). The Supreme Court has interpreted
§ 402 as permitting the Secretary to determine, as a threshold matter to bringing suit, whether
the alleged violation "probably infected the challenged election." Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass
Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 472 (1968). Thus, although not expressly so, the remedy
in § 402 is in fact a post-election remedy. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.4-.5 (1984).
59. LMRDA § 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1982). The Supreme Court has held that a
prima facie case establishing a violation of tit. IV shifts the burden to the union to demonstrate
that the violation did not affect the election outcome. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employ-
ees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 508-09 (1968). Despite this presumption in his favor, how-
ever, the Secretary may choose not to file suit unless he believes the violation has affected the
outcome. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 570 (1975). A substantial number of viola-
tions thus go unremedied. Of the 2,171 election complaints processed by the Department of
Labor during the period 1965-1978, 640 were closed because of insufficient evidence of effect
on outcome. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMIN., COMPLI-
ANCE, ENFORCEMENT AND REPORTING IN 1978 UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RE-
PORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 4 (1978).
60. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1982).
61. A member's election-related complaint can be disruptive of a union's internal affairs
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In contrast to title IV, the remedy provided in title I does not require the
aggrieved party to take his complaint to an administrative agency. A title I
complainant need only pursue internal remedies as required by section
101(a)(4) and file a civil action in federal court for "appropriate" relief.62
Unlike section 402, which spells out the specific remedy the court is to pro-
vide,6 3 section 102 leaves the remedy largely up to the discretion of the
court.64 Further, unlike section 402, which makes relief contingent not only
upon the finding of a violation, but also upon the finding that the violation
may have affected the outcome of the election,65 section 102 requires only a
showing that the plaintiffs rights have been violated.6 6 The differences be-
tween the remedial provisions of titles I and IV suggest that Congress in-
tended the two titles to serve different purposes. Title I, by giving the
member more immediate access to statutory relief, serves the purpose of pro-
tecting individual rights. But the choice of a federal court, rather than ad-
ministrative agency, as the forum for adjudicating those rights presupposes
the exercise of judicial self-restraint and limits the scope of title I complaints
to matters within the court's judicial competence. The provisos of section
101 further limit judicial discretion by requiring deference to union rules so
long as they are reasonable. 67 Title IV, by contrast, protects individual
rights only to the extent that violations of them may also have damaged the
union members' collective interest in conducting fair elections-a limitation
reflected in the requirement that relief is available under section 402 only if
the violation of title IV may have affected the election outcome.68 Although
and yet not be a challenge to the election. See Kupau v. Yamamoto, 622 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1980) (a title I plaintiff argued successfully that his suit to compel the union to install him in
the office for which he had successfully run was not precluded by § 403, even though the
union's refusal to install him was based on an issue-his ineligibility for office-that could
have been the grounds for a tit. IV action). As for determining when an election is "already
conducted," the task is complicated because an election is actually a series of processes, such as
naming the election committee, conducting nominations, campaigning, balloting, tabulating
the results, and installing the winners. Summers, Judicial Regulation, supra note 7, at 1224-26;
see also Crowley, 769 F.2d at 991-93.
62. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
63. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1982), provides in part that the court "shall de-
clare the election . . . to be void and direct the conduct of a new election under the supervision
of the Secretary" (emphasis added).
64. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982), authorizes "such relief (including injunc-
tions) as may be appropriate."
65. LMRDA § 402(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1982).
66. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
67. See LMRDA § 101(a)(l), (2), (4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l), (2), (4) (1982).
68. See supra note 59. The Crowley Court recognized that "eliminating all title I relief
• . . might preclude aggrieved union members from ever obtaining relief for statutory viola-
tions, since the more drastic remedies under Title IV" depend on a showing of an effect on the
election outcome. 104 S. Ct. at 2569. Where the effect of a violation of title IV cannot be
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title IV narrows the protections in that respect, it expands them in two
others, first by sparing the member the costs of private litigation, and second
by placing enforcement authority in the hands of an administrative agency
whose expertise qualifies it to review substantive internal union matters that
are beyond the expertise of the courts.
Although titles I and IV thus complement one another, the exclusivity
language of section 403 prevents an overlap of jurisdiction in cases "chal-
lenging an election already conducted." The ambiguity of this phrase, how-
ever, causes the scope of title I and title IV to be uncertain. Some
clarification, but only some, is offered by a review of the legislative history.
B. The Legislative History of the LMRDA6 9
Congressional interest in legislation to regulate internal union affairs was
accurately determined, as in cases involving the use of union funds to support candidates in
violation of § 401(g), the court will normally grant the relief sought by the Secretary. See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 28, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3494 (N.D. Cal.
1980). In such cases, preclusion of the members' individual rights by the "may have affected
the outcome" standard does not occur. But if the violation in question is the deprivation of the
member's right to vote, the effect on outcome is objectively measurable. If the number of
members who have been deprived of the right to vote is less than the successful candidate's
margin of victory, the Secretary will decline to file suit. See, e.g., Teamsters, Local 705, 50-
19408, 82-(LM)- 117 (case administratively closed 1982), summarized in U.S. DEP'T OF LA-
BOR, ELECTIONS DIGEST (SUPP. I), supra note 13, at § 940.6000.
The ultimate question posed in such situations is what purpose society hopes to advance by
regulating labor unions. If the purpose is primarily economic, the law can be more tolerant of
the subordination of individual to institutional interests in an election of union officers. Under
such a rationale, the continuity of union leadership, which protects the public interest in the
uninterrupted flow of commerce, outweighs the member's interest in rerunning the election,
with all the disruptions it would entail. But if society's purpose is also to preserve internal
union democracy and enhance the dignity of the worker, then minority voting and unsuccess-
ful candidacies have value beyond the immediate goal of winning the election. See Berchem,
supra note 13, at 51. See also Note, Election Remedies Under the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1617, 1624 (1965) ("[u]nion democracy will not be
advanced if, when such a member's rights have been infringed, he is denied judicial relief
merely because the violation did not affect the outcome of the election in question"); Summers,
Judicial Regulation, supra note 7, at 1248 ("[o]pposition groups in unions frequently have no
serious expectation of winning but seek only to voice a protest and perhaps build a base for
future elections"). For a thorough discussion of the economic and democratic dimensions of
the union's role, see Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH.
U.L. REV. 13, 50-62 (1982).
69. The use of the LMRDA's legislative history to interpret the statute is not without its
detractors. One commentator has observed:
[T]he numerous questions of interpretation posed by [the LMRDA's] various pro-
visions are likely to strain to the breaking point the established American legal habit
of looking to the legislative history to ascertain legislative intent . . . . The record of
the debate in Congress reveals a deliberate, if not extraordinary, effort to becloud, or
clarify, or prejudge, as the case may be. . . . One might anticipate that under these
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aroused by findings of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities
in the Labor or Management Field (the McClellan Committee). The Mc-
Clellan Committee's extensive hearings had revealed "corruption, breach of
trust, violence, abuse of power, denial of basic rights and democratic
processes to union members," and other improprieties.7" Among the Com-
mittee's conclusions was a recommendation for legislation "to insure union
democracy," including periodic elections of officers and the use of secret bal-
lots.71 Motivated in part by the McClellan Committee's interim report,72 in
part by a recognition that workers gain little if unionization merely substi-
tutes the tyranny of the union for that of the employer, and in part by the
antiunion animus of employer organizations,73 the Senate passed a bill in
1958 that would have required union financial disclosures and regulated
union trusteeships and elections of officers.74 The bill died in the House, but
Senator Kennedy introduced a revised version the following year.75 That
bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
which added forty-six amendments, many of them at the urging of Senator
Goldwater.76 The election provisions of the committee bill, S. 1555, guaran-
teed the right to nominate and vote, set maximum intervals between elec-
tions, and established general procedures for conducting elections.77
Enforcement of the election provisions was assigned to the Secretary of La-
bor, who was authorized to investigate alleged violations and supervise re-
medial elections.78 Like the final version of the statute, the committee bill
preserved existing rights and remedies prior to the election and made en-
forcement by the Secretary the exclusive remedy for challenging the com-
circumstances some courts will simply throw up their judicial hands and try to give
the statute a 'reasonable' interpretation derived from its 'four corners.'
Smith, supra note 2, at 197-98. Smith's skepticism is a reminder that interpretations based on
the legislative history should account not only for content but also for political motive.
70. 105 CONG. REC. 2669 (1959) (Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 1002. Similar language appears in § 2(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982).
71. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 450, 452 (1958).
72. Id.
73. See Summers, American Legislation, supra note 57, at 275-78; Cox, supra note 2, at
820-21.
74. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REC. 11487 (1958). See Cox, supra note 2,
at 821-22.
75. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
3, at 29. See 105 CONG. REC. 883 (1959) (Sen. KennedyJ, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 5, at 968. See also Cox, supra note 2, at 822.
76. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 338. See S. REP. No. 187, supra note 3, at 88, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
3, at 484.
77. S. 1555, supra note 76, at § 301.
78. Id. § 302.
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pleted election. 79 The bill contained, however, no individually enforceable
bill of rights.
In reporting the bill out in this form, the committee passed over an admin-
istration bill that would have provided for enforcement of the election provi-
sions through private civil action in state or federal court.8° The committee
majority explained that its choice of enforcement by the Secretary of Labor
would insure uniformity in the laws governing union elections. 8 The major-
ity also relied on the testimony of Professor Archibald Cox, who had testi-
fied that in addition to preserving uniformity, enforcement by the Secretary
would centralize control of proceedings and would reduce the likelihood of
vexatious litigation against the union on the one hand, and friendly private
actions to foreclose the Secretary's jurisdiction on the other.8 2 Enforcement
by the Secretary was also desirable, in Cox's opinion, because it removed the
courts from the business of supervising union elections-a task for which he
found them ill-equipped.8 3 What is most significant about the proposed en-
forcement procedure, however, is the unanimity with which the committee
reported it to the Senate. Although deep political differences divided the
committee on other portions of the bill, there were no dissenting comments
on the issue of enforcement by the Secretary of Labor.84
The committee bill's provisions for safeguarding the individual rights of
union members proved far more controversial than the election enforcement
79. Id. § 303. See LMRDA § 403.
80. See S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(d) (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 3, at 84, 112-13.
81. S. REP. No. 187, supra note 3, at 21, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
3, at 417.
82. Labor-Management Reform Legislation: Hearings on S. 505, S. 748, S, 76, S. 1002, S.
1137, and S. 1311 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub.
Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 119, 135 (1959) (statement of Archibald Cox, Professor,
Harvard Law School).
83. Cox testified as follows:
A court is . . . a clumsy instrument for supervising an election. The judicial pro-
cess may be suitable for determining the validity of an election which has already
been held; but if it is found invalid, or if no election has been held, judges have few
facilities for providing an effective remedy. . . . The court has no tellers, watchers,
or similar officials. It would become mired in the details of the electoral process. To
appoint a master to supervise the election would delegate the responsibility, but the
master would face many of the same problems as the judge. Probably it is the con-
sciousness of these weaknesses that has made judges so reluctant to interfere with
union elections, though apparently a few court-ordered elections have been held.
Id. at 133-34.
84. See especially the "Minority Views" portion of S. REP. No. 187, supra note 3, at 70,
104, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 466, 500, where the minority stated its satisfac-
tion with the Secretary's role but expressed regret that a similar remedy was not available prior
to the election.
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scheme. The majority, espousing what it called "a general philosophy of
legislative restraint,"85 opposed detailed procedures and standards. In the
majority's opinion, "[s]uch paternalistic regulation would weaken rather
than strengthen the labor movement. ' ,16 Thus, with respect to safeguarding
members' individual rights, the committee bill merely encouraged unions to
adopt voluntary codes of ethical practices, with progress to be monitored by
an "Advisory Committee on Ethical Practices." 87 The advisory committee
would report to the Secretary of Labor, who in turn would be required to
report his recommendations to Congress in three years.88 Senators Goldwa-
ter and Dirksen, writing in a "Minority Views" section of the committee
report, criticized the majority's approach as "full of 'gimmicks' intended to
lull the public into believing [the legislation] lives up to its advance billing as
a labor reform measure."8 9 They specifically cited the majority's failure to
provide a federally enforceable "bill of rights" to guarantee freedom of
speech, press, and assembly; equal treatment of all members by the union;
and due process in disciplinary actions.9°
During the subsequent debate on the Senate floor, Senator McClellan, re-
calling his observations during his own committee's hearings, argued that
the bill, in its present form, did not adequately protect union members'
rights.9 He therefore introduced an amendment that added an enumeration
of specific rights, including freedom from arbitrary financial exactions, pro-
tection of the right to sue, and a guaranteed right to inspect membership
lists.92 Violators would be subject to civil suit by the Secretary of Labor and
to criminal penalties.9
3
The lines of political division in the Senate became clear from the ensuing
debate on the McClellan proposal and a compromise amendment introduced
85. S. REP. No. 187, at 7, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 403.
86. Id.
87. S. 1555, supra note 76, §§ 401-03. The majority took this position despite contempo-
raneous scholarly commentary that the union codes of ethical practices were not effective in
safeguarding union democracy. See Summers, The Role of Legislation in Internal Union Af-
fairs, 10 LAB. L.J. 155, 158 (1959).
88. S. 1555, supra note 76, at §§ 402(a), 403.
89. S. REP. No. 187, supra note 3, at 70-71, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 466-67.
90. Id. at 70, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 466. Sen. McClellan had earlier
introduced his own bill that included a bill of rights. S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 260. See Rothman, Legislative History
of the "Bill of Rights"for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REV. 199, 205 (1960).
91. 105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959) (Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 1099.
92. Id. at 6475, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1102. The right to inspect
membership lists eventually became part of § 401(c) of the LMRDA.
93. Id. (McClellan amendment §§ 102, 103).
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by Senator Kuchel. The committee majority explained that it was not op-
posed to the rights themselves, but only to the creation of a federal remedy
that, according to Senator Kennedy, would duplicate protections already
available under state law, the committee bill, and the Taft-Hartley Act.9 4
When the McClellan amendment passed, however, by a single vote, southern
lawmakers grew uneasy with the notion of expanding the authority of the
federal government in the area of civil rights.95 To allay their fears, Senator
Kuchel introduced two days later a hastily drafted substitute amendment. 96
The Kuchel amendment added certain qualifying language to the McClellan
rights, substituted private civil suits for suits by the Secretary of Labor,
moved the criminal sanction to another title of the bill, and moved the right
to inspect membership lists into the election provisions of what would be-
come title IV.97 The amendment drew praise in the Senate for taking the
federal bureaucracy out of the union member's bill of rights and leaving en-
forcement in private hands. 98 The amendment, which was substantially
identical to the bill of rights in the final statute, passed by a vote of 77 to 14
and became title I of the bill. 99
The enforcement provision of title I underwent little change in the
House."O The criminal penalties proposed by Senator McClellan were lim-
ited to reach only instances of the deprivation of statutory rights by force or
violence.'' Along with this change and other minor variations in wording,
the conference committee adopted the House version of title . lo' By con-
trast, the Senate and House differed over the title IV enforcement procedure.
The House version would have permitted the member himself to bring suit
for violations of title IV instead of requiring him to file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor. 103 In the House's view, a losing faction in an election
could challenge an election more effectively by using local counsel than by
94. 105 CONG. REC. 6482 (1959) (Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 1108.
95. See supra note 5.
96. Cox, supra note 2, at 833, observes that "[tihe draftsmanship left much to be desired,
perhaps because of the haste and stress, the number of participants, and the priority of tactical
acceptability over nicety of expression." See also Rothman, supra note 90, at 206-07.
97. Rothman, supra note 90, at 206-07; see also 105 CONG. REC. 6693-94 (1959), 2 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1220-21.
98. 105 CONG. REC. 6721, 6726 (1959) (statements of Sens. Joseph Clark (D - Pa.) &
Estes Kefauver (D - Tenn.)), 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1233, 1238.
99. 105 CONG. REC. 6727 (1959), 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1239.
100. Rothman, supra note 90, at 208-09.
101. Id. at 208. See LMRDA § 610.
102. Rothman, supra note 90, at 209.
103. See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1959), reprinted
in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 759, 774-75.
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relying on the Secretary as plaintiff and moving party."° The House and
Senate did agree, however, that once a court had found unremedied viola-
tions, the proper corrective measure should consist of a remedial election
under the Secretary's supervision.' °5 The Senate version of the complaint
procedure prevailed in conference, but the conference report supplied little
explanation. 106
Although neither the Senate nor the House discussed in detail the conflict
of remedies posed by titles I and IV, Congress was aware of the problem. °7
AFL-CIO President George Meany raised the issue in his testimony before
the Joint Subcommittee on Labor-Management Reform Legislation. l10
President Meany complained that title I would confuse and weaken other
provisions of the bill. Citing the possibility that both the "equal rights" of
title I and the candidacy guarantee of title IV could be construed to protect
the right to run for office, he questioned how title I related to title IV.' 09 In
reply, Senator McClellan described the titles as "complementary" ' I 0 and re-
ferred to an earlier discussion on the same issue, in which Senator Kennedy
had stated that "the bill of rights must be read in conjunction with the re-
mainder of the bill." '' In another instance, the question arose as to
whether the plaintiff candidate could bring a private action under section
401(c) to compel the distribution of campaign literature by the union pursu-
ant to its statutory duty, if the election were completed before the court
104. Id. at 79, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 837 ("Supplementary Views" of
Reps. Elliott, Edith Green (D - Or.), Frank Thompson (D - N.J.), Stewart Udall (D - Ariz.),
and James O'Hara (D - Mich.)).
105. See S. REP. No. 187, supra note 3, at 21, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 417; H.R. REP. No. 741, supra note 103, at 17, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
3, at 775.
106. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 934, 939.
107. See Note, Pre-election Remedies under the Landrum-Griffin Act. The "Twilight Zone"
between Election Rights under Title IV and the Guarantees of Titles I and V, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (1974) ("congressional inattention to the interrelationship between the lan-
guage and enforcement schemes of [t]itles I and V and those of [t]itle IV has created a 'twilight
zone' of legal uncertainty where violations of the bill of rights and fiduciary obligation titles
occur in the context of union elections"). Early scholarly commentary likewise did not discuss
the conflict between titles I and IV in detail. See supra note 21.
108. Labor-Management Reform Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 3540, H.R. 3302, H.R.
4473, and H.R. 4474 Before a Joint Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1475 (1959) (testimony of George Meany).
109. Id. at 1484. Meany pointed out by way of example that both § 101(a)(1) and § 401(d)
(§ 401(e) as finally enacted) could be construed as protecting the right to be a candidate. He
asked how these provisions "tie in" with one another. Id.
110. Id. at 2284, 2286 (Sen. McClellan).
111. 105 CONG. REC. 6720 (1959), 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1232-33.
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could act." 2 Such a question presumes the existence of the impediment of
section 403 exclusivity language barring relief in a private action once the
election took place. The reply by Senator Javits expressed hope that the
judicial proceedings in the private action would be conducted with reason-
able speed because the member had a statutory right to go to court. 1 3 Thus,
the Senator's concerns suggest a recognition that once the election is com-
pleted, private remedies will become difficult if not impossible to obtain
without encroaching on the Secretary's preemptive jurisdiction.
Legislative discussions such as these indicate that Congress knowingly set-
tled for a statute containing overlapping rights, with the expectation that
post-election challenges would be consolidated in, or preempted by, the suit
by the Secretary of Labor." 4 The duplicative rights reflect a legislative con-
sensus that union members might need strong protections to deal with their
unions. The remedies, in contrast, reflect the underlying political differences
in Congress. Title I's remedy exemplifies the Senate committee minority's
concern for providing broad, immediate relief for violations of individual
rights. Title IV's remedy embodies the committee majority's desire to safe-
guard the majority will of the union members by limiting election suits to
situations in which there has been an effect on the election outcome, and by
assigning the power to enforce such disputes to the government agency most
familiar with internal union affairs.' Whatever the differences in legislative
policy, and despite the split between the Senate and House on the manner of
filing a title IV complaint, there was no expressed disagreement concerning
the desirability of assigning to the Secretary of Labor the responsibility for
supervising remedial elections." 6 As the analysis of the judicial treatment of
these issues reveals, courts after Calhoon have tended to focus on the unset-
tled issues of social policy, with a resulting confusion in the case law. 1 7 In
Crowley, however, the Supreme Court focused on a point of congressional
harmony-the appropriateness of designating the Secretary of Labor as the
exclusive supervisor of remedial elections of union officers." '1
112. Id. at 6728, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1241 (Sen. Karl Mundt (R -
S.D.)).
113. Id. at 6728-29, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 5, at 1241 (Sen. Jacob Javits (R -
N.Y.)).
114. "Already conducted" apparently posed no ambiguity for at least one of the Act's
framers, who commented: "Prior to the day of an election an individual can sue in a [s]tate.
The day after an election the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction." 105 CONG. REC. 6485
(1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). But see supra note 61.
115. See supra notes 59, 83 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 84, 105 and accompanying text; see also Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2567-
68.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 159-219.
118. See supra notes 98-99, 105 and accompanying text.
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II. CALHOON V. HARVEY: DEFINING THE LINES OF INSTITUTIONAL
POWER
Calhoon v. Harvey," 9 the United States Supreme Court's first interpreta-
tion of the LMRDA, involved a complaint filed by three members of a mari-
time union, alleging that the union had violated their right to nominate
candidates as guaranteed by section 101(a)(1) of the Act.' 20 Specifically, the
plaintiffs challenged two provisions in the union's bylaws, alleging that the
provisions rendered them incapable of nominating the candidates of their
choice. The challenged provisions prevented a member from nominating
anyone but himself for office and required five years membership in the na-
tional union and 180 days sea time under a union contract in each of two of
the three years preceding the election.' 2 ' The plaintiffs sought an injunction
to prevent the union from conducting the election until it amended its nomi-
nating procedures and eligibility requirements.
22
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the action, holding that the plaintiffs' allegations, even if true, did
not show a denial of the equal right to nominate or vote as guaranteed by
119. 379 U.S. 134 (1964). For commentary generally in agreement with Calhoon, see St.
Antoine, Landrum-Griffin 1965-66. A Calculus of Democratic Values, 19 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF.
ON LAB. 35, 39-43 (1967) (finding it "vaguely disquieting to see the best of scholars decrying a
'narrow and niggardly judicial approach' to the Act"); see also Note, Labor Law-Pre-Election
v. Post-Election Relief Under the LMRDA, 44 N.C.L. REV. 483, 486 (1966) ("the Court sup-
ported a general congressional policy against intervention in union affairs"); Comment, Titles I
& IVof the LMRDA: A Resolution of the Conflict of Remedies, 42 U. CI. L. REV. 166, 179
(1974) (Calhoon should be construed narrowly, but some courts have applied it in a manner
that leaves the bill of rights "virtually unenforceable in connection with union elections"). For
contrary views, see Note, supra note 107, at 1108 (preelection relief is essential to congressional
policy of ensuring member's right to "responsive, democratically-chosen exclusive bargaining
representatives"); James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in
National Union Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 309-10 (1978) (arguing that the
preclusion of election-related title I claims in Calhoon is contrary to the legislative history and
represents "the triumph of the administrative vision, as it focused all decisionmaking authority
in the Secretary [of Labor]").
120. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 135.
121. Id. at 135-36. The national union constitution also required that candidates for presi-
dent must previously have been elected and served as a full-time union official. See 324 F.2d at
487. In subsequent litigation under title IV, eligibility requirements similar to those imposed
by the union were found to violate § 401(e). See Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, Local 6, 391 U.S.
492 (1968) (unreasonable to require candidates to have prior service in lower office); Wirtz v.
National Maritime Union, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968) (self-nomination, if the only method
available for making nominations, deprives members of reasonable opportunity to nominate
candidates); Hodgson v. Longshoremen Local 1655, 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2893 (E.D. La.
1972) (eligibility requirement unreasonable when retroactively imposed (as was the 180-day
requirement in Calhoon)). The Secretary of Labor has incorporated these rulings into his in-
terpretative regulations. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.40, 452.54, 452.58 (1984).
122. Calhoon. 379 U.S. at 136.
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section 101(a)(1). 123 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs had alleged a violation of section
101(a)(1) and that section 102 jurisdiction therefore existed. 124 Noting the
importance of the questions and the conflicting views already prevalent
among the lower courts, 125 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The
Court described the principal question not in terms of union members' rights
under section 101, but in terms of the powers of the Secretary of Labor and
the courts to protect the rights that the Act established. 126 Thus, although
one of the holdings of the case would clarify the nature of the rights con-
ferred by section 101(a)(1), the Court's primary concern was to explicate the
administrative and judicial responsibilities assigned by the statute.
Within its broader discussion of institutional power, the Court identified
two narrow issues in the instant case-whether the plaintiffs' allegation that
they had been unlawfully denied the right to nominate candidates stated a
claim under section 101(a)(1), 127 and if not, whether the combined effect of
the union's candidate eligibility requirements and self-nomination rule could
be considered by a court in determining whether a violation of section
101(a)(1) had occurred. 21 With respect to the first issue, the Court con-
strued the "equal rights" language of section 101(a)(1) as a prohibition
against discrimination in the right to nominate or vote, not a guarantee of
the underlying rights themselves. 129 The Court found that the plaintiffs
were not victims of disparate treatment, that the union rules in question had
been uniformly applied, and that the plaintiffs had in fact taken full advan-
tage of the uniform rules by nominating themselves for office.' 30 Since they
had not shown a violation of the right protected by section 101(a)(1), the
Court held, the district court's jurisdiction under section 101 could not be
upheld. 13'
The Court was not content, however, to rest its conclusion on the "equal
rights" language alone. The Court bolstered its holding by reviewing section
123. Calhoon, 224 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See Calhoon, 324 F.2d at 487. The
Supreme Court noted that although the lower courts had referred to the issue as "jurisdic-
tional," they were in reality referring to whether the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action.
Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 137 n.9.
124. Calhoon, 324 F.2d at 489-90.
125. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 137.
126. The first sentence of the opinion stated: "This case raises important questions con-
cerning the powers of the Secretary of Labor and the federal courts to protect rights of employ-
ees guaranteed by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959." Id. at 135.
127. Id. at 138.
128. Id. at 139.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 138.
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101(a)(1) against the overall statutory scheme of resolving internal union
disputes. The Court noted that Congress had expressly qualified the rights
granted by that section by making them subject to "reasonable rules and
regulations" established by the union.132 Section 101(a)(1) thus reflected a
congressional judgment that the unions, not the courts, were in the better
position in the first instance to establish policies pertaining to internal union
affairs.' 33 The Court also explained that although the statute gave the courts
jurisdiction over questions of disparate treatment, title IV, which contained
its own "separate and different" procedure for resolving election disputes,
gave the Secretary of Labor responsibility for resolving substantive questions
of candidate eligibility. 13 4
The Court elaborated on the significance of the "separate and different"
title IV procedure in its discussion of the second issue in the instant case.
The Court explained that in view of the plaintiffs' failure to allege discrimi-
natory treatment, no cause of action would exist unless, as the Second Cir-
cuit had found, the combined effect of the union's nominating and eligibility
rules could be considered in determining whether discrimination had oc-
curred in violation of section 101(a)(1).' 35 Once again noting that eligibility
rules were within the scope of title IV rather than title I, the Court con-
cluded that violations of title IV were not relevant in determining a cause of
action under title I. 136 In distinguishing the two titles, the Court explained
that title IV developed a comprehensive scheme governing elections of of-
ficers, covering such matters as terms of office, campaign rights, balloting
procedures, and eligibility requirements. 13 7 With one exception,"' section
402 established an exclusive method for enforcing title IV rights through the
Secretary of Labor, whose special expertise Congress had chosen to util-
ize.' 3 9 In the Court's view, section 101 and title IV embodied a unified plan
132. Id. at 139. See supra note 14.
133. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 139.
134. Id. at 138.
135. Id. at 139.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 140. The election provisions were comprehensive enough to provoke one of
Professor Cox's few criticisms of the Act. He wrote that the election provisions "descend too
far into detail, impairing the ideal of self-government, but there is no requirement which can
seriously hamper a union's normal functioning." Cox, supra note 2, at 845.
138. LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1982), permits direct preelection suits by can-
didates to enforce their right to equal treatment in access to membership lists and distribution
of campaign literature by the union. As with § 101(a)(1) of the Act, enforcement of these
provisions of § 401(c) appears to require the court to adjudicate only the issue of disparate
treatment.
139. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140. One commentator has taken exception to the Court's no-
tion of the Secretary's expertise, pointing out that -[n]one of the functions assigned to the
Secretary-investigation, prosecution, and supervision of judicial relief-indicate a congres-
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for resolving internal union controversies-a plan whose priorities were first
to allow the unions "great latitude" in settling their internal affairs, and
where that does not succeed, to rely on the government agency most familiar
with the subject matter, and finally to utilize the courts as a last resort. 140
The Calhoon Court thus did more than resolve the issue of what consti-
tuted a cause of action under section 101(a)(1).14 ' The Court also set forth
its views on the statute's apportionment of enforcement power. Section
101(a)(1) proved a perfect vehicle for expounding the Court's views, because
of that section's neat separation of the predominantly legal question of dispa-
rate treatment from the more factual questions of the reasonableness of a
union's nominating procedures and eligibility requirements.1 42 The values
outlined by the Court 143 suggest that the more an internal union dispute
concerns matters requiring a detailed knowledge of internal union affairs, the
sional belief in his 'special knowledge.'" Note, Union Elections under the LMRDA, supra note
6, at 1285. Of course, to the extent the LMRDA imposed federal standards over matters never
previously controlled by federal law, the Secretary of Labor simply had not had occasion to
develop expertise in union officer elections prior to the passage of the Act. But the article
ignores other factors as well. It ignores testimony before Congress that the courts were not the
appropriate institution for the immediate enforcement of the election provisions. See supra
note 83. It also overlooks the inherent complexity of the decisions the enforcing authority is
required to make. See, e.g., the factors outlined in 29 C.F.R. § 452.36 (1983) for determining
the reasonableness of candidacy qualifications. Finally, it does not acknowledge the advan-
tages of assigning the responsibility for overseeing remedies to the party who is also responsible
for developing interpretational guidelines under the election provisions. The Secretary of La-
bor is in the best position to understand his own interpretational regulations and to apply them
correctly in a remedial election. By contrast, independent balloting agencies hired by unions
or appointed by the courts sometimes prove unequal to the task. As Professor Summers notes:
The use of outside agencies such as the Honest Ballot Association or the Election
Institute to conduct union elections may reduce but will seldom solve the problem of
[union] political control. If they do no more than collect the ballots and count them,
the most important parts of the election process are left in the hands of the incum-
bent officers. Seldom are such agencies given sufficient authority and responsibility
over the entire process to prevent political manipulation of critical details. They put
their imprint of integrity on an election whose integrity they cannot warrant and
thereby lull the courts into the pleasant illusion that intervention is unnecessary.
Summers, supra note 7, at 1229. See Marshall v. Watchmen, International Union of Police,
Local 2, 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2744 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (balloting agency failed to comply with
candidates' reasonable requests to distribute campaign literature pursuant to LMRDA
§ 401(c)); Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 399 F.2d 544
(2d Cir. 1968) (outside balloting agency supervised election involving unlawful self-nomination
procedure, unreasonable endorsement requirement for candidacy, failure to provide absentee
balloting despite mobile nature of employment, failure to hold election of certain officers, and
unlawful prior officeholding requirement).
140. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140.
141. Id. at 138.
142. LMRDA § 101(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(1) (1982), supra note 14.
143. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
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more the courts initially should defer either to the unions themselves or to
the Secretary of Labor's expertise under title IV.
An uncertainty that arises from Calhoon is the extent to which the Court's
pronouncements on allocation of power are limited by the facts of the case.
There are two such limitations. First, the case involved only section
101(a)(l)-a provision that is unique within section 101 in framing its enti-
tlements in terms of equality of rights rather than in terms of the underlying
substantive or procedural rights. Whereas the Court could draw a bright
line between legal and factual issues in section 101(a)(1), the distinction is
not so apparent in the other provisions of the bill of rights, where substantive
or procedural rights, and not merely the uniform application thereof, are
guaranteed. 44 Calhoon's deference to reasonable union rules and to the Sec-
retary of Labor in substantive election matters provides a partial answer.
Nonetheless, it would not appear to insulate the courts entirely from ever
having to assess, for example, the substantive reasonableness of union rules
to limit freedom of speech and assembly in a title I action. 45 That right
corresponds in section 101(a)(2) to the right to nondiscrimination in section
101(a)(1), and both are rights for which section 102 creates a private cause of
action in federal district court. Yet Calhoon, if broadly construed, would
disfavor title I jurisdiction over disputes whose resolution required some ex-
pertise in internal union affairs. Calhoon could, in effect, foreclose title I
jurisdiction over much of the bill of rights outside section 101(a)(1). The
better reading of Calhoon-better because it preserves at least the possibility
of jurisdiction over the substantive rights protected in the bill of rights-is to
limit Calhoon to situations involving a conflict between section 101(a)(1) and
title IV.
The second factual limitation of Calhoon concerns the Court's statement
that jurisdiction under section 102 depended "entirely" upon whether the
plaintiffs' complaint showed a violation of section 101(a)(1) rights.' 46 The
Court devoted much attention to the language of section 101(a)(1) but little
144. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1982), protects the substantive right to
free speech and assembly; § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 4 11(a)(3) (1982), establishes procedural
requirements for increasing dues and initiation fees and for imposing assessments; § 101(a)(4),
29 U.S.C. § 41 i(a)(4) (1982), protects the member's right to sue the union; § 101(a)(5), 29
U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(5) (1982), establishes due process in union disciplinary actions.
145. Under § 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 41 i(a)(2) (1982), the right to free
speech and assembly is made subject to reasonable union rules. See supra note 38 and accom-
panying text; see also United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (where the out-
come rested on the Court's assessment of whether union rules prohibiting campaign
contributions from outside the union were a reasonable restriction of § 101(a)(2) rights).
146. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 138.
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to the language of section 102.147 That section, by its terms, could be con-
strued as containing two prerequisites for relief: first, that the alleged viola-
tion be a violation of title I; and second, that the remedy sought by the
plaintiff be "appropriate."' 141 It is not clear from the Court's decision how
much consideration, if any, the Court meant to give to the second prerequi-
site. The Court's statement that section 102 jurisdiction depended "en-
tirely" on the existence of a valid section 101(a)(1) allegation could mean
that, as a general principle, the remedy sought will not be a determinative
factor for jurisdiction. Alternatively, it could mean that in the circum-
stances of this particular case, the remedy being sought was appropriate and
that jurisdiction would therefore lie if the plaintiffs had also stated a valid
cause of action.
A discussion of the remedy would have entailed essentially a repetition of
the Court's analysis of the plaintiffs' basic allegation. The injunction the
plaintiffs sought would have required the court not only to postpone the
election, but also to adjudge the reasonableness of the changes in the union's
nomination procedures and eligibility rules.' 49 The Court had already ex-
plained that the statute delegated decisions about substantive election proce-
dures to the Secretary of Labor.' 50 The remedy sought by the plaintiffs thus
suffered from the same defect as their attempted section 101(a)(1) claim-
both would have involved the district court in matters that were beyond its
statutorily defined judicial competence. Therefore, in stating that jurisdic-
tion in this case depended entirely on whether the plaintiffs stated a valid
section 101(a)(1) claim, the Court may have perceived that so far as the
proper forum for resolving the dispute was concerned, the remedy was
merely the reciprocal of the claim, and both were outside the institutional
powers assigned to the courts by the statute. In any event, the ambiguity on
this question does not affect the holding of the case, which is that the court
should dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff does not state a valid claim, not
that the court will necessarily have jurisdiction merely because the plaintiff
does state a valid claim.
A final point to be noted about Calhoon is that the Court's dismissal for
failure to state a claim did not rest on the exclusivity language of section 403
of the Act. The plaintiffs' claim failed in the first instance because of the
147. The Court mentioned § 102 only twice, and then only for the purpose of identifying
the jurisdictional provision's location in the statute. See Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 138, 140.
148. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982), provides in pertinent part: "Any person
whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this
title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including
injunctions) as may be appropriate."
149. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 136. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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failure to state a cause of action under section 101(a)(1), not because of any
preemptive effect of section 403. It was not until after finding that the plain-
tiffs had not stated a cause of action that the Court discussed the title IV
remedy, noting that it was the exclusive method for protecting rights guar-
anteed by that title.15' The Court thus alluded to section 403 to illustrate
the consistency between its interpretation of section 101(a)(1) and the stat-
ute's scheme of allocating power between the courts and the Secretary of
Labor.' 52 The Court did not, however, offer a detailed interpretation of sec-
tion 403.
In retrospect, Calhoon is a peculiar combination of the narrow and the
broad. The Court decided the case on narrow grounds, providing only a
statement of when a cause of action did not exist, and not of when jurisdic-
tion did.' 53 Since this was its first interpretation of LMRDA, however, the
Court also took the occasion to enunciate general policy guidelines concern-
ing the allocation of power between the courts and the Secretary of Labor.154
Under the facts of the case, the Court made it clear that section 101(a)(1)
protects only against disparate treatment, 155 that violations of title IV are
irrelevant in determining jurisdiction under title 1,156 and that the court
must dismiss the action if no title I claim is stated.' 5 7 Beyond these facts,
the Court's decision spoke in broader terms, suggesting that the more an
issue depends on substantive knowledge of internal union affairs for its reso-
lution, the less inclined the courts should be to intervene.' The decision
did not specifically reach the bill of rights beyond section 101(a)(1), nor did
it purport to interpret the exclusivity clause of section 403. Further, it left
unresolved, or resolved only silently, the role of the appropriateness of the
remedy for determining title I jurisdiction. It is when these questions arise
in the context of an election of officers that the courts after Calhoon prove
most uncertain about the interplay between titles I and IV.
III. JURISDICTION IN THE CALHOON-CROWLEY INTERVAL
A. Identifying the Cause of Action
The courts generally have had little difficulty in applying the Calhoon test
151. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140.
152. Id. at 139-41.
153. Id. at 139, 141.
154. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
155. Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 139.
156. Id. at 139-40.
157. Id. at 138-39.
158. Id. at 139-40.
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for determining the existence of a section 101(a)(1) cause of action.' 5 9 The
straightforwardness of the test, however, sometimes has been obscured by
the desire of the court to reach a result that was in all respects fair to the
plaintiff. In one such case, Turner v. Dempster,160 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California found a valid title I cause of
action in a member's complaint that a maritime union's rule requiring six
years on-deck experience as a prerequisite to the right to vote in matters
other than elections of officers was unreasonable within the meaning of sec-
tion 101(a)(1).' 61 The Secretary of Labor had previously notified the union
that the six-year requirement would be deemed an unreasonable and there-
fore unlawful restriction on the right to vote in elections of officers as guar-
anteed by title IV of the LMRDA. 16
2
The court, noting that the plaintiff's claim was not a title IV matter be-
cause it pertained to voting in union referendums rather than in elections of
officers, held that in view of the LMRDA's overall purpose of insuring union
democracy, some provision of the Act must furnish the protection that title
IV would otherwise have provided.163 The court identified section 101(a)(1)
159. For cases wherein a cause of action was stated, see Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine
Operators, 567 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (ineligible members permitted to vote in referen-
dum); Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967) (employment requirement
nonuniformly applied to disqualify member from candidacy); Stettner v. International Printing
Pressmen, 278 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (union counted votes in referendum even
though not cast in accordance with union rules).
For cases where no cause of action was found, see Hofmann v. Schaefer, 648 F.2d 934 (4th
Cir. 1981) (uniformly applied union rule rendered plaintiff ineligible for office); McNail v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 549 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, Rank and File Comm. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Philadelphia Joint Bd.,
473 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1973) (same); Davis v. Turner, 395 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1968) (same).
160. 569 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 743 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1984).
161. Id. at 686. The union's rule did not distinguish between voting in elections of officers
and voting in other union referendums. Id. at 685-86.
162. Id. at 685-86. The Secretary would normally tolerate the postponement of the right to
vote until a member has established a relationship with the union by maintaining good stand-
ing for a reasonable length of time, such as six months or one year. 29 C.F.R. § 452.88 (1984).
163. 569 F. Supp. at 688. That the LMRDA was not intended to be a cure-all seems clear
from §§ 103, 403, and 603, 29 U.S.C. §§ 413, 483, 523 (1982), which preserve the rights and
remedies otherwise available under state and federal law. Cf Adams-Lundy v. Association of
Professional Flight Attendants, 731 F.2d 1154, 1159-60 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting Congress' gen-
eral preference for extrajudicial resolution of labor union disputes). The Turner court faced
the dilemma of either (1) finding a valid cause of action and thus running afoul of Calhoon or
(2) dismissing for failure to state a claim and thus leaving the member without a federal rem-
edy. Under an interpretation less strict than Justice Black's in Calhoon, "equal rights" could
encompass not only the discriminatory application of union rules, but also the discriminatory
effects of the rules regardless of whether they are uniformly applied. With § 101(a)(1) so con-
strued, the Court in Calhoon could still have dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds by
reason of the preemptive effect of § 403. Such a ruling would have preserved, or at least would
not have precluded, § 101(a)(1) challenges to the substantive reasonableness of election rules
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as the only section that could reasonably be construed to apply to referen-
dums.164 The court then found that the plaintiff had made the requisite dis-
crimination charge inasmuch as he had challenged an eligibility rule that
made an unreasonable distinction between members with more than six
years sea time and members with less.' 65 The court did not mention, how-
ever, that as with the five-year rule in Calhoon, the "discrimination" alleged
here occurred not in the application of the rule, but in its effect on the mem-
bers.166 Calhoon had specifically declined to look beyond the application of
the rule. Further, there was nothing in Calhoon to suggest that the Court's
refusal to find a cause of action was contingent on the availability of relief in
some other forum, or to suggest that had no other forum been available, the
Supreme Court would have broadened its interpretation of section 101(a)(1)
to reach discriminatory effects as well as discriminatory application. Under
the Calhoon rationale, such broadening would have taken the Court beyond
its statutorily defined area of competence.
The irreconcilability of Turner and Calhoon places in perspective the role
that the concept of fairness plays after Calhoon in the Act's scheme for
resolving internal union disputes. The standard of fairness appears in sec-
tion 401(c), which requires that the union provide adequate safeguards to
insure a fair election of officers.167 That standard has no express counterpart
outside the context of an election of officers. Calhoon, however, forecloses title I relief in such
actions and forces the member to rely on intra-union or state remedies. Resort to the former
may prove futile. See, e.g., Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 856-57 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 960 (1974). As for state courts, it is difficult to understand why they should be any
more institutionally competent than federal courts to adjudicate such disputes. Institutional
expertise at that point would cease to be a jurisdictional factor. At bottom, then, Calhoon
embodies a policy of narrow construction of federal court authority, under which the courts
will reach the merits of the case only to the extent the LMRDA unambiguously authorizes
them to do so. Ambiguities such as "equal rights" will be resolved in favor of minimal involve-
ment by the federal judiciary.
Elsewhere, Justice Black would state:
I believe that both the making and the changing of laws which affect the substan-
tial rights of the people are primarily for Congress, not this Court. Most especially is
this so when the laws involved are the focus of strongly held views of powerful but
antagonistic political and economic interests. The Court's function in the application
and interpretation of such laws must be carefully limited to avoid encroaching on the
power of Congress to determine policies and make laws to carry them out.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 256-57 (1970) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). In Calhoon, Justice Black's strict constructionism, ipombined with the statute's express
restrictions on intervention in internal union affairs, see supra note 6, overshadowed whatever
significance might otherwise have been attached to the bill of rights as an expression of Con-
gress' desire for broader protections of union members' rights under title I.
164. 569 F. Supp. at 688.
165. Id. at 689.
166. Id. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
167. LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1982). See also 29 C.F.R. § 452.110 (1984).
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in section 101(a)(1), which requires of union rules only that they be reason-
able.168 Under Calhoon's narrow construction of section 101(a)(1), the dif-
ference between titles I and IV could be deemed to reflect a congressional
intent to subject union officer elections and other internal union voting to
different degrees of outside scrutiny. The Turner court, believing that the
degree of scrutiny set by Calhoon was too lenient here in that it would leave
the plaintiff without a federal remedy, preferred a slightly broader interpre-
tation of section 101(a)(l)-one that, although not dispensing with the stan-
dard of reasonableness, at least enabled the court to apply that standard to
effectuate the overall statutory goal of insuring union democracy. 6 9 The
Turner court parted company with Calhoon in this respect, but it followed
Calhoon's scheme of institutional power by the deference it gave to the Sec-
retary of Labor's determination that the union's voter eligibility rule was an
unreasonable restriction on the right to vote in an election of officers. 7 '
Thus, although Turner involved voting outside the context of an election of
officers, it did nonetheless represent an attempt by the court to harmonize
the rights conferred by title I with the institutional values of title IV.
B. Schonfeld v. Penza: Title I Jurisdiction and the Suppression of Dissent
The uncertainty of the interplay between titles I and IV becomes apparent
in title I cases that raise issues other than the existence of a section 101(a)(1)
cause of action. In Schonfeld v. Penza,'7 1 the controversy expanded to in-
clude section 101(a)(2). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld jurisdiction over a member's complaint that the union vio-
lated his free speech and association rights under section 101(a)(2) when it
removed him from office and barred him from seeking office for a period of
five years.' 72 Schonfeld, the member in question, had long been the leader of
an insurgent faction within the district union. He had unsuccessfully run for
office ten years prior to the filing of the instant action. He later ran success-
fully in a court-ordered election held for the purpose of terminating a trus-
The LMRDA incorporates in § 401(c) a standard of honesty and fair competition that state
courts had been hesitant to recognize in pre-LMRDA lawsuits concerning union officer elec-
tions. Summers, supra note 7, at 1256.
168. See supra note 14.
169. 569 F. Supp. at 688.
170. Id. The court stressed the need to "move very carefully in this area" and to give
"great deference to the union." Id. at 690. The court also recognized that its rulings might
produce difficulties. Id. at 691. It found support for its active posture, however, not only in
the broad purpose of the statute, which was to create "a statutory basis for ensuring union
democracy," but also in the fact that the Secretary of Labor had already pronounced the
union's voter eligibility rule unreasonable for purposes of tit. IV. Id.
171. 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
172. Id. at 901.
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teeship that the court found had been established in bad faith to keep the
previous incumbent group in power.'7 3 Although Schonfeld occupied the
chief executive office of the union, the infighting between him and the other
faction continued, culminating in union disciplinary charges against him.' 7 4
A union trial board convicted him of bypassing an agreed-upon procedure
for assigning work to locals within the district and of misrepresenting facts
to the district's Council of Delegates.' 75
Schonfeld's suit alleged that his subsequent removal from office and dis-
qualification from candidacy violated the members' section 101(a)(1) right to
nominate candidates and vote in elections; their right to express their views,
as guaranteed by section 101(a)(2); and the procedural safeguards in union
disciplinary proceedings, as guaranteed by section 101(a)(5).' 76 The Second
Circuit reversed the district court's assertion of jurisdiction over the section
101(a)(1) claim, ruling that challenges to Schonfeld's removal from office
and disqualification were within the scope of the substantive nominating and
candidacy rights guaranteed by section 401(e) of the Act, and that the
proper avenue of relief was, therefore, to pursue internal union remedies and
file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.' 77 The court also noted that
Schonfeld's section 101(a)(1) claims did not involve the infringement of an
"equal right," and that under Calhoon, Schonfeld therefore had not stated a
cause of action under section 101 (a)(1). '78 As to the section 101 (a)(2) claim,
however, the court found that in view of this union's history of internal
strife, the actions taken against Schonfeld could constitute a form of intimi-
dation of the membership through reprisal against Schonfeld and others for
their efforts to change union procedures.' 7 9 The court found that unlike
denials of voting and election rights, which the LMRDA assigned to title IV,
the alleged infringement of the free speech and association rights did not
require a title IV appeal to the Secretary of Labor.'8 °
173. Id. at 901 n.2.
174. Id. at 901 n. 1. The Second Circuit commended Judge Brieant for his attempts to end
the infighting. The court observed, however, that "[like the Hatfields and McCoys, ... it
appears that District Council No. 9 prefers to keep on 'feudin' and fusin' and a-fightin.' ". Id.
at 901 n.2.
175. Id. at 901 n.l.
176. Id. at 901-02.
177. Id. at 902-03.
178. Id. at 903.
179. Id.
180. Id. The court also upheld the district court's jurisdiction over the § 101(a)(5) claim.
The Second Circuit agreed with holdings in other circuits "that title I ... protects the union-
member relationship, but not the union-official relationship." Id. at 904. Therefore, the dis-
trict court properly asserted jurisdiction over the claim insofar as it pertained to the actions
rendering Schonfeld, as a member, ineligible to run for office. Id. The Supreme Court has
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If the Schonfeld court had said no more with respect to section 101(a)(2),
the decision would have typified the conventional analysis of that section. 1
The court, however, fearing that its holding might be construed to take a
case out of title IV merely because the plaintiff had appended a free speech
allegation to what was essentially an election complaint, devised a test for
reconciling the competing values of the title I rights and the title IV proce-
dural requirements.18 2 According to the court, title I intervention in actions
abridging both titles I and IV should be limited to cases in which the alleged
violations could be "fairly said, as a result of established union history or
articulated policy, to be part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt by union
officials to suppress dissent within the union." '183
That the Schonfeld court felt compelled to narrow the reach of section
101(a)(2) suggests a misreading of the Calhoon decision. The holding in
Calhoon concerned section 101(a)(1), not section 101(a)(2) or title IV."8 4
The Schonfeld court, however, interpreted Calhoon as supportive of the nar-
rowing of title I rights when they are abridged in the context of an election
of union officers.' In reality, Calhoon merely compelled the plaintiff to
state a valid cause of action based on a right protected by title 1.186 In a
section 101(a)(1) complaint, the protected right is nondiscrimination, and a
member must therefore allege discrimination in order to state a valid claim.
By analogy, the protected rights for section 101(a)(2) complaints are the
rights to free speech and assembly, and a plaintiff would state a valid claim
by alleging the infringement of any of these particular rights. In Calhoon,
the scope of the right to nondiscrimination did not become more restricted
merely because title IV may also have protected the same right. The thresh-
subsequently confirmed that title I protects members as members, but does not protect their
status as union officers or employees. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 438 (1982).
181. Courts generally have construed § 101(a)(2) broadly. The leading case is Salzhandler
v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963), where the same court
ruled that a union could not discipline a member for criticizing union officials, even if his
statements may have been libelous. The breadth accorded § 101(a)(2) in Salzhandler has been
criticized. See Beaird & Player, supra note 35, at 589-93. Nevertheless, the case has been
"religiously followed." Id. at 592 n.75 (collecting authority). The Second Circuit's insistence
on narrowing § 101(a)(2) in Schonfeld is thus all the more puzzling because of the broad inter-
pretation it gave the same provision in Salzhandler. Further, the Second Circuit recently reaf-
firmed Salzhandler in Petramale v. Laborers International Union of North America, Local 17,
736 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1984).
182. 477 F.2d at 903-04.
183. Id. at 904.
184. See supra notes 127-28, 151-53, 155-57 and accompanying text.
185. 477 F.2d at 903.
186. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text. Without such a claim, jurisdiction
could not be established.
[Vol. 34:181
Institutional Power Under the LMRDA
old consideration was to state a valid claim. Calhoon preserved with preci-
sion the rights conferred by section 101(a)(1).
Schonfeld is inconsistent with Calhoon in two respects. First, Schonfeld
narrows the scope of a title I right by imposing a restrictive test that would
not apply if a title IV issue were not also implicated.' 87 Schonfeld thus at-
tributes greater preemptive effect to the exclusivity provision of section 403
than did Calhoon, which made only passing reference to it.'8 8  Second,
Schonfeld's test for determining jurisdiction bypasses the allocation of insti-
tutional power delineated in Calhoon. Under Schonfeld, jurisdiction de-
pends not on the inherent capability of the court to decide the question
presented, but rather on the existence of a deliberate attempt to suppress
dissent within the union. In essence, jurisdiction is not contingent on judi-
cial values such as institutional competence, but on the legislative and social
values underlying the Act.
Notwithstanding this shift in the basis for determining jurisdiction, Schon-
feld does represent one of the few judicial attempts to reconcile the jurisdic-
tional conflict between titles I and IV. In contrast to Calhoon, where the
disposition of the action rested on title I alone, Schonfeld expressly viewed
its section 101(a)(2) test as a reconciliation of the competing values of the
187. See Comment, Titles I & IV of the LMRDA, supra note 119, at 174 ("The effect of
Schonfeld's additional requirement is a partial substantive preclusion of section 101(a)(2)
claims."). See also Driscoll v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, 484
F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973) (relying on Schonfeld to deny jurisdiction over member's claim that
union rule requiring candidates for office to execute non-Communist affidavit violated
§ 101(a)(2)). Courts do not limit their use of the Schonfeld test to jurisdictional issues or to
§ 101(a)(2). In Adams-Lundy v. Association of Professional Flight Attendants, 731 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir. 1984), an eleven-member majority of a politically divided union governing board
sought injunctive relief under § 102 after the remaining nine board members had suspended
them from office. The suspension vote, in which the minority prohibited the majority from
participating, resulted from the majority's refusal to vote in support of certain resolutions that
the minority deemed a "litmus test" of union loyalty. Id. at 1156. In discussing the plaintiffs'
claim that the membership's right to vote had been thwarted by the action of the board's
minority faction, the Fifth Circuit, apparently alluding to the "equal rights" standard of
§ 101(a)(1), noted that a similar claim had been rejected in Schonfeld because it was not the
type of direct interference with voting rights comprehended by the Act. Id. at 1159. Without
otherwise distinguishing § 101(a)(l) from § 101(a)(2), however, the court also applied the
Schonfeld jurisdictional test to the voting rights claims of the plaintiffs. The Adams-Lundy
court found that although the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' conduct was an-
tidemocratic, there was no claim that the defendants were "attempting to dismantle the
union's electoral system" or that members who opposed the minority faction were "suppressed
or threatened with reprisals." Id. Therefore, the court concluded, "there has been no infringe-
ment of the basic rights of membership protected by §§ 101 and 102." Id. Thus the Schonfeld
test, which the Second Circuit had developed to resolve a jurisdictional issue in a § 101(a)(2)
matter, became for the Fifth Circuit a basis for analyzing the substantive issue in a § 101(a)(1)
claim.
188. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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two titles. 189 But the values it perceived--epitomized in the court's phrase
"democratic spirit"' 9°-were those that Calhoon treated as having been rec-
onciled, to the extent possible, during the legislative debate.19' Schonfeld
was thus a step towards reconciling titles I and IV, but it was a step in a
different direction from Calhoon, for it was based on considerations of social
policy rather than institutional power.
C. Kupau v. Yamamoto: The Race to the Courthouse
The conflict between titles I and IV emerged in full form in Kupau v.
Yamamoto, 192 a consolidation of a post-election title I suit on behalf of a
successful candidate and a title IV suit by the Secretary of Labor in response
to a complaint from one of the candidate's opponents. The title I plaintiff,
Kupau, won election to the office of financial secretary-business representa-
tive of Carpenters Local 745.193 Before his installation, however, the na-
tional union president ruled him ineligible on the basis of an employment
requirement in the union constitution.' 94 That ruling conflicted with a rul-
ing Kupau's supporters had obtained from the local election committee prior
to the election.' 95 The union refused to install him and ordered a runoff
election between the other previously nominated candidates.196 Kupau and
his supporters filed suit under section 101(a)(1), alleging that the union's
inconsistent application of its eligibility rules, as well as the plan to hold a
new election without reopening nominations, deprived them of their equal
right to nominate and vote. 19 7
189. Schonfeld, 477 F.2d at 904.
190. Id. at 903.
191. Justice Black based his majority opinion in Calhoon on the language and structure of
the statute, without delving into the legislative history. 379 U.S. at 141. The concurring opin-
ion was less satisfied that the statute on its face resolved the underlying political differences.
Id. at 144 (Stewart, J., concurring).
192. 622 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1980).
193. Id. at 452.
194. The union constitution required that each candidate work at the trade or depend on
the trade for a livelihood. Kupau's eligibility was questionable because he had been working as
a project manager of a housing development, which did not entail working with carpentry
tools. Id. at 452. The Secretary of Labor's regulations state that working-at-the-trade require-
ments are "ordinarily reasonable," and that the union's interpretation of its constitution and
rules will be accepted unless the interpretation is "clearly unreasonable." 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.3,
452.41 (1984).
195. 622 F.2d at 452. The local election committee ruled Kupau eligible based on an ex-
amination of "additional materials describing Kupau's duties and responsibilities." Id.
196. Id. at 452, 453-54.
197. Id. at 453-54. Kupau also filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor under
LMRDA § 402(a), protesting his disqualification by the national president. The Secretary
declined to file suit, concluding that: (1) the national president's interpretation of the constitu-
tion was not "clearly unreasonable," 29 C.F.R. § 452.3 (1984), and was therefore not unlawful;
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The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii ordered
Kupau installed,' 9 whereupon his leading opponent, Ito, filed a complaint
with the Secretary of Labor under section 402.'99 The Secretary filed suit to
compel a new election, alleging that the union had violated title IV by al-
lowing Kupau to be a candidate and hold office despite his constitutional
ineligibility. 2 ' The district court denied Kupau's motion to intervene in the
title IV action but stayed that action pending his appeal of the denial of
intervention.21 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld the injunctive relief granted in the title I action and dismissed the
title IV suit.
20 2
The Ninth Circuit first discussed whether title I jurisdiction existed.2" 3
Citing Calhoon, the court noted that a federal district court lacked jurisdic-
tion in the absence of a valid claim under section 101(a)(1). 2 4 The title I
plaintiffs here had stated a valid claim, the court found, inasmuch as they
had complained of the uneven application of eligibility qualifications, and
not merely that the qualifications had been evenly applied but were of dispa-
rate impact. 2 05 Disagreeing with the Secretary of Labor, the court found
that the main concern of the claim was discrimination and not substantive
eligibility requirements, and that characterizing the claim in this manner
brought it within the scope of title 1.206 In so ruling on the cause of action,
the court adhered to the guidelines in Calhoon, which had classified claims
according to the court's statutory competence to decide them.20 7 In decid-
ing the question of jurisdiction, however, the Kupau court was required to go
beyond Calhoon, in which dismissal had been based on plaintiffs' failure to
state a cause of action under section 101(a)(1). The contrary finding in
Kupau-that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action-gave rise to the
further question whether any other factors need be considered that might
preempt the court's title I jurisdiction.
and (2) the evidence established that Kupau was in fact a supervisor and was therefore ineligi-
ble under the union constitution. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Statement of Reasons for Dismissing
the Complaint of Walter H. Kupau 2-3 (Office of Labor-Management Standards Enforcement
case no. 73-1066 (1979)).
198. Kupau v. Yamamoto, 455 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Hawaii 1978).
199. See Kupau, 622 F.2d at 453.
200. Id. at 452-53.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 458.
203. Id. at 453 ("the existence or lack of title I jurisdiction is critical and at the core of
these consolidated appeals").
204. Id.
205. Id. at 453-54.
206. Id. at 454.
207. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
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The potential impediment to title I jurisdiction for the Kupau court was
title IV, with its underlying policy of reliance on the Secretary of Labor and
its exclusive remedy provision.20 ' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that despite
the Calhoon Court's failure specifically to state that charges of disparate
treatment in eligibility requirements could properly be brought under section
101(a)(l), the Supreme Court had sought to distinguish challenges to the
substantive eligibility rules from challenges to the application of such rules,
with the latter being a valid claim for relief under section 101(a)(1).20 9 In
this respect, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion was consistent with Calhoon.
Calhoon, however, had described jurisdiction on the basis of institutional
capabilities, allowing the more substantive election questions to fall within
the Secretary of Labor's area of responsibility. The Kupau court, in con-
trast, focused almost exclusively on the nature of the claim, paying little
heed to the questions of institutional power that underlay the Supreme
Court's characterization of the claims. The Ninth Circuit noted that total
preemption of title I relief by title IV would be at odds with the legislative
intent of title I, which was to augment title IV, not to be subordinate to it.2"'
For the court, the crucial inquiry was whether a member had been subject to
disparate treatment in the exercise of title I rights. If he had, the court held,
title IV claims would not preempt his title I claim. 2" The court bolstered its
conclusion by noting that although section 403 of the Act made section 402
the exclusive remedy for challenging an election that had already been con-
ducted, the plaintiffs' claim here had not ripened until after the election had
been completed.212 Drawing on the legislative history, which revealed that
title I had been added to enlarge members' rights, the court held that the
plaintiffs should not be denied relief merely because the union had waited
until after the election "to take action effectively disenfranchising a majority
of the electorate. 213
Throughout this argument, the court drifted further away from the insti-
tutional analysis endorsed by Calhoon and into an analysis based on the
Act's overall goal of protecting members against inequitable treatment by
their union. The court did not discuss whether, notwithstanding the appar-
ent unfairness with which Kupau had been treated, the resolution of the
dispute would involve judgments that the Secretary of Labor, rather than the
court, might be better equipped to make. Specifically, when the district
208. 622 F.2d at 454-55.
209. Id. at 454.
210. Id. at 455.
211. Id. (citing Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1967)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 456. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
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court ordered Kupau's installation, the court had to determine not only
whether disparate treatment had occurred, but also whether, based on the
union's constitution, Kupau was in fact eligible to hold office. Under the
Calhoon allocation of power, the first issue was properly one for the court,
but the second issue, requiring a determination of substantive eligibility
rights and an interpretation of the union's constitution, was within the dis-
cretion first of the union, then of the Secretary of Labor, and finally of the
court, deferring to the two previous authorities.2" 4
The further difficulty faced by the Kupau court was that the potentially
preemptive suit by the Secretary of Labor was in this case a reality, not a
mere abstract proposition. The court was required to interpret section 403
so as not only to avoid precluding title I relief, but also to rationalize the
dismissal of the Secretary's action. Focusing on the language of section 403,
the court characterized the Secretary's suit as a challenge not to the union's
election, but to the district court's injunction.2" 5 In the court's view,
Kupau's opponent, who was the title IV complainant to the Secretary, had
already obtained from the union the exact relief he sought from the Secre-
tary-the union's agreement to rerun the election, with Kupau no longer
among the candidates.2" 6 Therefore, the court concluded, the title IV com-
plainant was not aggrieved by any union action, and there was no genuine
dispute between him and the union that could serve as the basis for the Sec-
retary's action.21 7 The Secretary's suit, according to the court, was nothing
but an attempt to "subvert" the relief granted by the district court.218 The
crucial determination of Kupau's eligibility fell to the district court, which,
by ordering his installation, reached a result contrary to the findings of the
union and the Secretary of Labor, both of whom the statute entitles to defer-
ence in matters of substantive eligibility rights.
214. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
215. 622 F.2d at 458. The court did not explain whether it considered Kupau's suit a
"challenge" to the election as contemplated by § 403. Insofar as Kupau sought an injunction
directing the union to install him in office, his suit could be characterized as an implementation
of the election rather than a challenge to it. The right to hold office as guaranteed by § 401(e)
of the LMRDA, however, has been construed to include complaints alleging that a union has
improperly refused to install a victorious candidate. See Marshall v. Railway Carmen, Local
875, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2673 (S.D. Miss. 1979), afld, 622 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981); Wirtz v. Teamsters, Local 73, 257 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Ohio
1966). Suits "challenging" an election could thus be construed to reach not only the actual
conduct of the balloting, but also the union's implementation of the election results. Constru-
ing "challenging" broadly would lessen the likelihood of collateral attacks on the overall elec-
tion process that might undercut the finality of the Secretary of Labor's post-election suit.
216. 622 F.2d at 458.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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In dismissing the Secretary's suit, the Ninth Circuit made complete its
transition from an analysis based on institutional expertise, to an analysis
based on public policy. The court's treatment of titles I and IV seemed more
to underscore the tensions between them than to resolve them into a harmo-
nious scheme. In characterizing the Secretary's suit as a challenge to the
district court rather than to the union, the court turned the jurisdictional
question into a race to the courthouse between the title I plaintiff and the
Secretary of Labor. This was a race that the Secretary, because of the time-
consuming exhaustion of remedies and investigation requirements of section
402,219 would invariably lose.
IV. LOCAL 82 v. CROWLEY: DEFINING THE REMEDIAL POWER OF THE
COURTS
In Kupau, the Ninth Circuit allowed the district court to supplant the
Secretary of Labor as the arbiter of a dispute over candidate eligibility. In
Local 82, Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley,22° judicial intervention en-
compassed the entire union nomination and election process. The plaintiff
members had been excluded from a nominations meeting because of their
failure to present computerized dues receipts. After some of them did pro-
duce the receipts and gain admission, they nominated one of themselves,
Lynch, to run for secretary-treasurer against the incumbent, Griffiths, who
was presiding over the nomination proceedings. The meeting was generally
disorderly. At one point, Griffiths read aloud lists of members who were
eligible and ineligible for candidacy. Lynch was among the eligible mem-
bers, but four of the other plaintiffs were on the ineligible list. Further, even
though the local contained 750 members, only twenty-seven names appeared
on the two lists. Five of the plaintiffs were among those omitted from both
lists. Questions concerning the lists ensued, and order was never fully re-
stored. At the end of the meeting, Griffiths declared himself the sole nomi-
nee for secretary-treasurer and therefore proclaimed himself elected. He
listed Lynch among the candidates for president. 221
The plaintiffs filed suit under title I, alleging, among other things, 222 that
219. LMRDA § 402(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a), (b) (1982), requires the member to pursue
internal remedies for three months. The member then has one month to file a complaint with
the Secretary, and the Secretary has sixty days within which to conduct an investigation and
file suit. If a full investigation requires more than 60 days, the Secretary sometimes seeks a
waiver by the union of its defense of timeliness. See Donovan v. Operating Engineers, Local
369, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2742 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
220. 521 F. Supp. 614 (D. Mass. 1981), afd, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd and
remanded, 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984).
221. 679 F.2d at 982.
222. The plaintiffs also alleged (1) that the union's rule limiting candidacy to members who
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the imposition of the dues-receipt requirement violated their section
101(a)(1) equal rights to nominate candidates and attend membership meet-
ings, and their section 101(a)(2) right to express views freely at union meet-
ings.223 They further alleged that the union's failure to recognize Lynch's
nomination for secretary-treasurer violated section 101(a)(1). 224 In the in-
terim, the union had begun to conduct its balloting by mail. 25 On the day
before the union's established deadline for returning voted ballots, the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a tem-
porary restraining order (TRO) to preserve the status quo and the court's
jurisdiction. 226 By the time the TRO was issued, most of the members had
returned their voted ballots to the union.227 The TRO required that the
ballots be sealed and deposited with the court until a final determination
could be made on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 228
Seven months later, following hearings before the court and negotiations be-
tween the parties, the court issued a preliminary injunction voiding the elec-
tion and ordering new nominations and balloting under the supervision of an
independent balloting agency. 22
9
The district court found that since the plaintiffs had alleged disparate
treatment, their claims under title I gave the court jurisdiction under section
102 regardless of whether the plaintiffs may also have had title IV claims.23°
After finding that the dues-receipt requirement was inconsistent with the
union's past practice, that the requirement had been waived for the incum-
bent officers attending the nominations meeting, and that Lynch was eligible
and had been duly nominated for secretary-treasurer, the court concluded
had timely paid their dues for 24 consecutive months prior to the nominations meeting vio-
lated § 101 (a)(1) because of its disparate impact and also violated § 401(e) because of its unrea-
sonableness; and (2) that the union had increased its dues without complying with § 101(a)(3).
521 F. Supp. at 620-21. The district court denied jurisdiction over the candidate eligibility
claims. Id. at 622. The § 101(a)(3) claim was resolved partially in the plaintiffs' favor. Id. at
633-34.
223. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. at 2560-61.
224. Id. at 2561.
225. Id. at 2560. Election of union officers by mail ballot is an acceptable practice under
title IV. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.97, 452.102 (1984). See also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR-
MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, ELECTING UNION OFFICERS 27-28 (1980).
226. 521 F. Supp. at 618.
227. 104 S. Ct. at 2561.
228. 521 F. Supp. at 618.
229. 104 S. Ct. at 2561. The injunction appears at 521 F. Supp. at 636-37. The independ-
ent balloting agency named in the injunction was chosen by the plaintiffs. The union did not
avail itself of the opportunity to object to the plaintiffs' choice. Id. at 634. The court's satisfac-
tion with this arrangement suggests the court's failure to consider that the mere use of an
outside arbitrator offered no assurance that the election would conform to title IV. See supra
note 139.
230. 521 F. Supp. at 622-23.
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that an injunction should issue with respect to the section 101(a)(1) and (2)
claims.23' In granting the injunctive relief, the court relied heavily on the
public policy favoring the protection of individual rights of union mem-
bers.232 Other than noting that the injunction was intended to interfere as
little as possible with the union's established procedures, 233 the court did not
discuss the propriety of the injunction in terms of the institutional values set
forth in Calhoon.234
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, despite
the intervention of the Secretary of Labor in opposition to the injunction.235
The First Circuit framed the issue as whether, in view of the fact that the
election had progressed as far as it had, title IV preempted title I, as least
insofar as the district court had ordered a new election. 236 Thus, in framing
the issue, the court implicitly recognized two factors as crucial to the deter-
mination of the case-the comprehensive nature of the district court's rem-
edy, and the timing of the district court's intervention. However, the First
Circuit discussed these factors solely within the context of section 403,
where both of them were crucial in determining whether title IV preclusion
exists, 2 37 without even mentioning that the nature of the remedy could also
be dispositive of a member's suit under section 102 insofar as that section
contemplated actions for "appropriate" relief.
To determine whether the plaintiffs had stated a valid title I claim, the
court first examined Calhoon and noted the need to allege disparate treat-
ment and not merely unequal effects of a uniformly applied union rule.23 8
Next, the court examined several LMRDA decisions by the Supreme Court,
finding in two of them-Trbovich v. United Mine Workers239 and Dunlop v.
231. Id. at 624-27.
232. Id. at 628. The public interest was one of four factors the court considered to deter-
mine whether the injunction should issue. The court also found (1) that the plaintiffs had
shown a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2) that if preliminary relief were
denied, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury by having to remain in a local whose
officers' elections had been tainted by likely violations of title I; and (3) that the harm plaintiffs
would likely suffer if relief were denied outweighed the burden imposed on the union by the
injunction. Id. at 627-28.
233. Id. at 634.
234. Instead, the court relied on the Kupau court's assertion that ifa member states a title I
claim, the court has jurisdiction regardless of the presence of title IV claims. Id. at 623 (citing
Kupau, 622 F.2d at 455). See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
235. 679 F.2d 978, 984 (1st Cir. 1982).
236. Id. at 985.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 985-86.
239. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). In Trbovich, the Court held that title IV did not bar intervention
by a union member in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor. The Court thus recognized
the strength of individual interests under title IV. See Comment, Judicial Review of Adminis-
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Bachowski24'-a policy of greater solicitude for the rights of aggrieved union
members that undermined "Calhoon's policy of noninterference." 241 Fi-
nally, the court reviewed in some detail the legislative history surrounding
the enactment of the LMRDA bill of rights and concluded that the legisla-
tive goals of title IV did not preempt title I in the instant case. 242 The court
thus followed the same sequence of analysis as the courts had in Schonfeld
and Kupau-first relying on Calhoon to determine whether a title I cause of
action existed, and then invoking the overall public policy goals of the Act to
support the need for the court to grant relief under title 1.243
After concluding that the plaintiffs' claims were genuine title I claims and
not merely title IV claims with a title I label,24 the Crowley court identified
trative Discretion under Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 after Dunlop v. Bachowski, 10 GA. L. REV. 818, 826 (1976). However, any hope that
Trbovich signalled a change in the Calhoon posture of consolidating substantive election issues
in the Secretary's suit was diminished by the limits that the Trbovich Court imposed on the
intervenor. According to Trbovich, the member could intervene, but he was required to re-
strict his intervention to the election violations presented in the Secretary's complaint. 404
U.S. at 537. In effect, the Trbovich Court recognized that although the Secretary was in cer-
tain respects the complaining member's lawyer, the Secretary also represented a transcending
public interest in the orderly resolution of election disputes. Id. at 539.
240. 421 U.S. 560 (1975). In Bachowski, the Court ruled that the Secretary's decision not
to sue in response to a member's title IV complaint was subject to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act. As in Trbovich, the Court recognized that the Secretary's
views were not sacrosanct, and that both private and public interests were at stake. See Com-
ment, Judicial Review, supra note 239, at 827. However, the Bachowski Court also held that
the reviewing court could not conduct a "trial-type inquiry into the factual bases of the Secre-
tary's conclusion," but rather was limited to determining whether the Secretary's rationale for
declining to file suit "evince[d] that the Secretary's decision [was] so irrational as to constitute
the decision arbitrary and capricious." 421 U.S. at 566, 572-73. Bachowski notwithstanding,
the Secretary seems to have lost little by becoming subject to this deferential standard of re-
view. See, e.g., Torres v. Donovan, Ill L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3140 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Balanoff v.
Donovan, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2592 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Fay v. Marshall, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2047 (D. Nev. 1980); Bath v. Marshall, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2866 (D. Colo. 1980); and other
cases summarized in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ELECTIONS DIGEST (Supp. 1 1983), supra note 13,
§ 930.2100, at 753-56, all of which were ultimately decided in the Secretary's favor. From the
perspective of protecting the individual rights of union members, the monotony of the result
seems to support a recognized fear that Bachowski paid mere "lip service" to protecting such
rights. See Comment, Judicial Review, supra note 239, at 839. From the perspective of the
allocation of enforcement power, however, Bachowski merely confirmed what Calhoon had
already stated about deferring to the Secretary's expertise in substantive election matters. See
supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
241. 679 F.2d at 986.
242. Id. at 987-90.
243. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schonfeld; supra
notes 203-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kupau.
244. 679 F.2d at 990-91. The court's attitude was reminiscent of the Schonfeld court's fear
that complaining members might attempt to convert title IV claims into title I claims merely
by appending a free speech claim. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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the remaining impediment to title I jurisdiction as being the possibility that
the election was "already conducted" within the meaning of section 403 of
the Act.245 Conceding that the legislative history on this point was unclear,
that the cases were not in accord, and that the phrase itself was not free from
ambiguity, the court declared that "already conducted" meant "previously
carried out."' 2 4 6 The court reasoned that since the ballots here remained
uncounted, the election was not "previously carried out," and section 403
did not preclude jurisidiction. 247 The court identified three policies in sup-
port of its interpretation of section 403, but none of them involved Calhoon's
delineation of institutional power.248 The court did state, however, that it
was cognizant that preclusion by title IV would enable the court to utilize
the Secretary of Labor's expertise.24 9 Yet, it also noted that Congress' desire
for full enforcement of title I, as revealed in the legislative history, overrode
the need for the Secretary's expertise and any other arguments set forth in
favor of title IV. 250
The dissent, written by Judge Campbell, maintained that Congress had
established a special mechanism for conducting remedial elections, which
the Secretary of Labor was to administer under court supervision.25' More-
over, he cautioned against court-supervised elections that utilized proce-
dures other than those authorized by the union's own rules.252 He thus
adhered to the scheme of institutional priorities outlined in Calhoon, under
which responsibility for resolving election disputes fell first to the union,
then to the Secretary of Labor, and only then to the courts.
2 53
245. 679 F.2d at 991.
246. Id. at 991-92.
247. Id. at 992-93.
248. According to the court, the policies enhanced by § 403 preclusion were (1) the "need
for effective relief"; (2) the benefits of "preresult judicial relief"; and (3) the need to discourage
members from "sandbagging" by waiting to see whether they had won or lost the election
before filing suit. Id. at 993. The court took no notice, however, of the fact that if the
"sandbagging" members won the election and had been precluded from filing a preelection
suit, no court or union resources would have been expended for litigation. The court's argu-
ment was justifiable, however, on the facts of Crowley because the alleged violation-the failure
to list an eligible and duly nominated candidate on the ballot-clearly affected the outcome of
the election. Still, the court's argument cannot rise to the level of a generally applicable princi-
ple, because in many cases, such as those alleging the denial of a member's right to vote, the
effect on the election's outcome cannot be assessed until after the election is completed. Com-
plaining members would not be "sandbagging." Rather, they would be acting in conformance
with the statute, which delays the decision on remedial action until the violation's practical
effect on the outcome is determinable.
249. Id. at 993-94.
250. Id. at 994.
251. Id. at 1004 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 1005.
253. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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By reviving the judicial values set forth in Calhoon, Judge Campbell laid
the foundation for the Supreme Court's ruling on this case. The Court re-
versed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the action for a
counting of the impounded ballots.254 Focusing on the question of title I
jurisdiction, the Court noted that section 102, by itself, seemed to suggest
that a member could properly maintain a title I suit whenever rights guaran-
teed by that title had been violated. 255 The Court noted, however, that sec-
tion 102 limited the relief available to that which was "appropriate" in a
given situation256-a factor not expressly discussed in Calhoon. Then, as the
Calhoon Court had done, the Crowley Court analyzed the statutory provi-
sion at issue within the broader context of the LMRDA enforcement and
remedial scheme and concluded that the Act's exclusive method for protect-
ing title IV rights reflected Congress' desire not to permit individuals to
block or delay union elections by filing private suits.
257
The Court identified the crucial issue as whether title I remedies were
available to union members while an election was "being conducted.
258
Construing the language of section 403, the Court found that full title I
rights would be available to members "prior to the conduct" of an election,
and that after the election had been completed, section 403 plainly barred
title I relief to members challenging the validity of the election. 259 Neither
the statute itself nor the legislative history, however, provided a direct indi-
cation of how section 403 should apply to title I suits during an ongoing
election.2 Despite this deficiency, the legislative history did provide a clear
indication of Congress' intention to consolidate election challenges in the
Secretary of Labor and to have him supervise remedial elections necessitated
by application of the Act. 26' The Court inferred from this policy a strong
suggestion that Congress would not have considered a court order requiring
judicial supervision of a remedial election to be "appropriate" relief under
section 102, even if the plaintiffs properly alleged and proved violations of
title 1.262 Therefore, the Crowley Court concluded, whether a title I action
could be maintained during the course of an election depended upon the
254. 104 S. Ct. 2557, 2571 (1984).
255. Id. at 2564.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2565-67. The Court observed that it would not "be appropriate to interpret the
enforcement and remedial provisions of title I in isolation." Id. at 2565.
258. Id. at 2566.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 2566-67.
261. Id. at 2567-68. See supra notes 84, 105 and accompanying text.
262. Id. at 2567.
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nature of the relief being sought.26 3 If a plaintiff sought the invalidation of
an election already being conducted, and court supervision of a new election,
the plaintiff was required to utilize the title IV remedy. If the plaintiff
sought "less intrusive remedies," however, the district court retained the au-
thority to order appropriate relief under title 1.264
As the Court implied,265 this conclusion was a logical extension of
Calhoon and the policies the Court had previously identified as underlying
the enforcement scheme of the Act. Calhoon, the Crowley Court explained,
declined to allow the district court to assert jurisdiction under title I to hear
title IV claims, just as congressional policy had deferred to the unions and
the Secretary of Labor.266 Moreover, the Court had reiterated this policy in
subsequent decisions, including Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, which the
First Circuit had cited to support the contrary argument that Calhoon had
been undercut by a policy of greater solicitude for the rights of aggrieved
union members. 26' The use of Trbovich to support opposite positions reflects
the difference between the Supreme Court's and the First Circuit's concept
of "policy." The First Circuit used "policy" to refer to the social values
embodied in the substantive provisions of the statute.268 Hence, Trbovich
could be said to evince a policy in favor of protecting union members' rights
because the Court permitted a title IV complaining member to intervene in a
section 402 suit brought by the Secretary of Labor. But when the Supreme
Court discussed policy in Calhoon and Crowley, it addressed questions con-
cerning how the courts and the Secretary of Labor should proceed to protect
the rights conferred, rather than questions of whose rights are favored-a
judgment that had been made by Congress. Trbovich again was appropriate,
because although the Court there permitted intervention by a union member
in a title IV action, the intervenor was limited to raising only those issues
raised in the Secretary of Labor's complaint. 269 Trbovich thus preserved the
values established in Calhoon, because it disallowed the member unrestricted
access to the court in a title IV matter, requiring him instead to limit his
intervention to the issues defined by the Secretary of Labor's expertise.
Throughout its treatment of the jurisdiction question, therefore, the
Supreme Court has been concerned with policy in the judicial, rather than
the legislative or political, sense. By failing to follow the judicial policy
263. Id.
264. Id. at 2571.
265. Id. at 2570-71.
266. Id. at 2569-70. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 239.
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enunciated in Calhoon, the Schonfeld and Kupau courts, and the lower
courts in Crowley, went astray.27° The Crowley Court's nod in the direction
of public policy can be seen in the Court's statements inviting the use of title
I in certain election-related circumstances.271 The Court specifically left
open the possibility of title I relief in actions seeking "less intrusive reme-
dies" that could be implemented without "substantially delaying or invali-
dating an ongoing election. '27 2 How these phrases are to be interpreted the
Court did not say, and the full preemptive effect of section 403 thus remains
uncertain."' But the Court did make it clear that in determining whether
preemption has occurred, the courts should look not only to the nature of
the rights being asserted, but also to the appropriateness of the remedy being
sought.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Crowley complements its decision twenty
years earlier in Calhoon. Crowley reaffirms the Court's commitment to the
values of minimal judicial intervention in internal union affairs and defer-
ence to valid union rules and the specialized knowledge of the Secretary of
Labor. Although the immediate result of Crowley was to dismiss a suit by
union members whose title I rights the Court agreed had been violated, the
intended effect of the decision was not to diminish those rights, but rather to
insure that their vindication would take place in the forum most capable of
providing an accurate and adequate remedy.274 In addition, Crowley also
270. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schonfeld; supra
notes 192-219 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kupau; supra notes 230-33, 248-50
and accompanying text for a discussion of Crowley.
271. See, e.g., the Court's statement that § 403 does not foreclose the availability of all
post-election relief, 104 S. Ct. at 2566 n. 16; and the Court's concern that overly broad preemp-
tion of title I by title IV might prevent members from ever obtaining relief for violations of the
Act, id. at 2569. See supra note 68.
272. 104 S. Ct. at 2557, 2568-69.
273. The scope of "ongoing election" is of particular importance when intermediate or
national labor organizations elect their officers by a vote among convention delegates. In such
cases, the elections of the convention delegates must be conducted in accordance with title IV.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.22, 452.27, 452.119-.133 (1984). The election of parent organization
officers can be said to be "ongoing" when the election of delegates occurs. The time interval
between the election of delegates and the election of parent organization officers varies from
union to union, and it is not clear from Crowley where the point of § 403 preemption would
fall. For an early instance of the application of Crowley to an election of delegates, see Bishop
v. DuVal, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3273 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), where the court held that a title I
challenge to a May 1984 election of delegates who would vote for national officers at an Au-
gust 1984 convention involved an ongoing election of national officers, and that ordering new
delegate elections in July 1984 would substantially delay such an ongoing election. The court,
therefore, dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 3274.
274. Thus, the Court assured the plaintiffs that they would still have access to the remedies
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complements Calhoon by filling a void in the earlier Court's interpretation of
section 102 of the LMRDA. Crowley furnishes a definitive interpretation of
both the jurisdictional function and the substantive meaning of that section's
provision for "appropriate" relief.
Crowley is not without its limitations, chief among them the fact that the
jurisdictional test it announces is dispositive only if the title I plaintiff seeks
the remedy of voiding and rerunning an election of union officers under the
court's supervision.275 Crowley preserves, however, Calhoon's practice of
stating the broader judicial values that can guide the courts in resolving ju-
risdictional issues even if the facts are distinguishable. Recognizing that
there is ultimately no bright line between titles I and IV, the Court has none-
theless made it clear that the more a remedy disrupts the election process or
requires judgments in the specialized area of internal union affairs, the more
likely that section 403 will preempt the title I jurisdiction of a court.
Michael Klise*
available under title IV once the ballots were counted and the election completed. 104 S. Ct. at
2571 n.23.
275. See supra notes 272, 273 and accompanying text.
* The author is an employee of the U.S. Department of Labor. The views expressed in
this Note are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department
of Labor or any other federal agency.
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